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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the impact of declining defense 
budgets on the JMSDF. Because of the huge debt of the Government of Japan 
(GOJ) and financial structural reform, the GOJ is trying to reduce all expenditures, 
including defense expenditures. 
Conversely, Japan and countries in its vicinity face the threat of 
uncertainty. China is increasing its defense budget to build a modern oceanic 
navy. North Korea recently conducted a nuclear test despite the overwhelming 
opposition of the international community. 
Therefore, it is a big challenge for the JMSDF to sustain and develop its 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
Since the end of the Cold War, the international security environment has 
dramatically changed. The most striking characteristic at present is the diversity 
and complexity of various threats. Under this environment, it is not possible to 
predict how serious threats will emerge in the real world. In particular, the 
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 caused a significant change in the 
traditional idea of national security. Even though the terrorist attacks led to a 
tightened relationship between the U.S. and other countries, those nations still 
struggled to prevent terrorist attacks. Terrorists continue to attack the 
international community. For example, some terrorist groups intended to blast 
twelve airplanes between London and various U.S. cities in August 2006; as a 
result of that plot, 24 men were arrested in Britain. 
For Japan and its neighbors, the main concern is China, which continues 
to increase its defense budget and intends to modernize its naval capability. In 
the early morning of November 10, 2004, a Chinese submarine violated 
Japanese territorial waters. An order for maritime security operations was issued 
to the Commander of the Self Defense Fleet (SDF) in response to a cabinet 
decision. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) requested the 
submarine to navigate on the surface to show the flag.1 This is just one example 
of China’s increased testing of its neighbors’ capabilities. 
Another national security concern for Japan is North Korea. The North 
Koreans abducted fifteen people in ten separate incidents between 1977 and 
1983. Most of them are still in North Korean captivity. Also, North Korean fishing 
vessels are deployed around the Sea of Japan for unknown purposes. In October 
2006, North Korea carried out a nuclear test despite the overwhelming opposition 
of the international community. Such provocations are likely to continue. 
                                            
1 Defense Agency, ed., Defense of Japan 2005 (Tokyo: Gyosei, 2005), 
http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2005/w2005_00.html (accessed April 2007). 
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Because of the changing international security environment, the force 
structure of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF), the Japan Maritime 
Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), and Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF), 
should be adapted to fit the new realities. Recently, in order to ensure the peace 
and safety of Japan in the current security environment, the Security Council and 
Cabinet of the Government of Japan approved the “National Defense Program 
Guidelines, FY 2005-.”2  Thus, it could be said that it is time for a transition 
toward reform of the defense power structure. 
 From the beginning, the JMSDF budget has been almost continuously 
increased so that the JMSDF could enhance its capabilities by procurement of 
various kinds of vessels, thereby achieving a sustained military preparedness. 
However, around 1990, the Japanese economy experienced a downturn that 
started a long recession lasting throughout the 1990s—the Lost Decade. As a 
result of this recession and the attendant huge government debt, the JMSDF no 
longer can expect increasing budgets for consecutive fiscal years. Actually, 
defense budgets stopped growing in fiscal year 1998. 
Under the constraints of budget and financial problems, the use of military 
force now plays a broader role in the international community than simply 
deterring or responding to armed conflict. Military force is used for a variety of 
purposes, including military operations other than war (MOOTW). This research 
paper focuses on the procurement of naval ships by the JMSDF. An analysis of 
how the JMSDF could manage the size of its naval power and shipbuilding plans 
under the constraints of tightening budgets and increased mission requirements 
is presented. 
Considering the overall situation, it is very challenging for the JMSDF to 
secure the homeland and seas in the vicinity of Japan — with existing 
unpredictable and uncertain threats—without sufficient budgeting resources. 
 
                                            
2 “NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES, FY 2005-" Approved by the Security 
Council and the Cabinet on December 10, 2004, 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/policy/f_work/taikou05/fy20050101.pdf (accessed March 2007). 
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B. OBJECTIVE 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze how the declining defense budget 
will impact the future maritime strategy by examining historical budgetary data 
and the transitioning of the maritime defense strategy. This thesis is focused 
specifically on the shipbuilding account. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
The Japanese defense budget is declining even as the threats of 
unpredictable conflict are increasing. The JMSDF must secure Japan and 
neighboring areas in the future. Thus, the primary question of this thesis is, “what 
effect has the declining defense budget had on JMSDF capabilities and maritime 
strategy, especially on shipbuilding?” Warships, including submarines, are the 
most costly procurement items in the JMSDF budget and also the main 
equipment of the organization. They are the main elements needed to complete 
the maritime strategy and fulfill the JMSDF’s mission. 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
• What are the characteristics of Japan’s defense budget and its 
military forces? An historical trend of the defense budget is 
described with its relation to the defense budget structure. As for 
the military forces, the Constitution of Japan plays an important role 
in restricting the force structure. 
• How does the JMSDF sustain its capabilities under the pressure of 
the declining defense budget? Will the JMSDF need to review its 
long/short-term guidelines?  
• How did the JMSDF manage the shipbuilding account in the past? 
Did the JMSDF have some difficulties? If not, why? 
• Has the JMSDF strategy changed historically? Is there some 
correlation between budget and strategy? 
4 
• How does the relationship with the U.S. Navy affect JMSDF 
strategy? What does the U.S. Navy expect from the JMSDF as a 
coalition force, and vice versa? 
• Will the declining defense budget affect the shipbuilding 
companies? What portion of their sales does the JMSDF 
shipbuilding account for? Will the decline in defense shipbuilding 
result in a reduced ability for the shipbuilding industry to keep pace 
with advanced technology? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
Multiple sources of published material were utilized to compile a database 
of background documentation and future projections, as they related to the 
implementation of the shipbuilding program of the JMSDF. Mainly, data on the 
national budget and the defense budgets were collected from the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF) website database and the Maritime Staff Office, Tokyo. These 
data were mostly utilized to review the historical trends and to understand the 
current situation with past background.  
The data for the shipbuilding accounts for each ship were obtained from 
the MOF database in order to conduct an historical comparison in terms of 
account management. These data were used to analyze how the JMSDF 
managed the shipbuilding account and to track the transition of the five-year 
payment plan in the second part of the thesis. This analysis examined how the 
JMSDF managed the shipbuilding account, with some difficulties, under the 
pressure of declining defense budget. The differences between shipbuilding 
plans and actual shipbuilding were also examined. 
The maritime strategy was tracked from the white paper that is published 
by the Ministry of Defense every year. These data were analyzed in the first part 




shipbuilding strategy. Understanding that the defense strategy complements the 
defense budget policy itself, because the defense budget is reflected in the 
strategy through monetary terms.  
Finally, based on the previous analysis, the impact of declining defense 
budgets on the JMSDF was examined and conclusions were made.  In order to 
project the probability of future destroyer procurements, simple linear regression 
is introduced to examine how the historical data are utilized. This thesis 
describes the projections for the budget and shipbuilding for the future. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
Following this Introduction, Chapter II reviews the transition in defense 
strategy after the end of WWⅡ. The JMSDF history is reviewed from its 
establishment at the beginning and the maritime strategy, which is a part of the 
defense strategy. It is examined in terms of the relationship between the U.S. 
Navy and the JMSDF. Finally, the transition of the defense strategy is 
overviewed to provide an understanding of the historical background for the 
JMSDF. 
Chapter III is an historical data presentation about the national budget, the 
defense budget, and the JMSDF shipbuilding account. In this chapter that 
reviews the Japanese budget characteristics and current fiscal situation, the 
relationship between the national budget and the defense budget is described. In 
addition, the shipbuilding program in the JMSDF is examined in order to 
understand how the JMSDF has managed the shipbuilding account. 
Chapter IV analyzes the impact of the declining defense budget from the 
aspects of defense strategy, the shipbuilding program, and the latest shipbuilding 
technology. The impact on the defense strategy is examined in terms of the 
shipbuilding program, the fleet concept, and the alliance with the U.S. Navy. 




methods with a single linear regression model and projections for a future 
shipbuilding program. Finally, the impact on technology and the shipbuilding 
industry is presented. 
Chapter V presents conclusions and recommendations regarding the 



















II. TRANSITION OF THE DEFENSE STRATEGY AFTER THE 
END OF WWII 
A. BIRTH OF THE JMSDF  
1. Establishment 
At noon on August 15, 1945, the Imperial Edict from the Emperor Hirohito 
was broadcast throughout Japanese territory to announce the end of the war and 
the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. This meant that the Japanese 
people would have their first experience with foreign occupation since the dawn 
of their country’s history.  After the end of World War II, the General 
Headquarters (GHQ) of the Allied Powers occupied all of Japan and General 
Douglas MacArthur of the United States Army served as the Supreme 
Commander of the Allied Powers. 
The defeat in this war had significant influence on Japanese citizens, so 
much so that they were willing to change their national attitudes, especially 
toward military affairs. As a result, implementation of total disarmament and 
demobilization by the GHQ was accepted without large protests and former 
military personnel were purged from public offices; some of them were 
prosecuted by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. 
The Potsdam Declaration, formulated by the U.S., China, and the U.K. as 
an instrument of surrender, set the framework for the democratization and 
demilitarization of Japan. It emphasized that Japan's militaristic leaders would be 
removed from power, its ability to make war would be dismantled, its military 
would be disarmed, and all military industries would be prohibited.3  On the other 
hand, the U.S. government issued the “U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for 
Japan”4 as a statement of incipient policy after the surrender of Japan. This 
clearly described the ultimate objective: “to insure that Japan will not again 
                                            
3 “Potsdam Declaration,” National Diet Library, Japan, 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html (accessed March 2007). 
4 “U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan,” National Diet Library, Japan, 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryo/01/022_2/022_2_002r.html (accessed March 2007). 
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become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the 
world.” 5   In order to achieve this purpose, General MacArthur ordered the 
dissolution of all ground, air, and naval forces. Consequently, the seventy-seven 
year history of the Imperial Japanese Navy came to an end. This meant an end 
to the glorious emphasis on military power and a collapse of modern Japanese 
growth and technical progress for the military. 
Deprived of any military capability after 1945, Japan had only occupation 
forces to maintain public order. However, due to the outbreak of the Korean War 
on June 25, 1950, most of the occupation forces were redeployed to the Korean 
peninsula. At that time, GHQ realized that there was a necessity to build up some 
internal force for public security in Japan. General MacArthur sent a letter to 
Prime Minister Yoshida  Shigeru with an order. He wrote, “I authorize your 
government to take the necessary measures to establish a national police 
reserve of 75,000 men and expand the existing authorized strength of the 
personnel serving under the Maritime Safety Board by an additional 8,000.”6 The 
Government of Japan enforced the law to form the National Police Reserve. 
However, the Japanese government officially called the reserve personnel 
“police.”  This organization was equivalent to a small sized military because it 
was equipped with M1 Garand rifles, rocket launchers, and small tanks.   
After independence was restored in 1952, the Japanese government 
integrated the National Police Reserve with the Maritime Safety Board to 
establish the National Security Agency, whose purpose was to defend the whole 
country from direct and indirect invasion. This was the first step toward 
militarization. At this time, Japan had a force of 110,000 ground strength, 7,600 
naval strength, 120 airplanes, and 18 frigates.7 
                                            
5 “U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan.” 
6 “Douglas MacArthur's Letter to Prime Minister,” National Diet Library, Japan, 
<http://www.ndl.go.jp/modern/img_r/M010/M010-001r.html (accessed March 2007). 
7 Yuzuru Tamura, comment on “Transition of the SDF,” http://www.cc.matsuyama-
u.ac.jp/~tamura/jieitainoennkakutosinnboutaikou.htm (accessed March 2007). 
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Finally in 1954, based on the Defense Agency Establishment Act and the 
Self Defense Force Act, the Japanese Government established the Defense 
Agency with JGSDF (Japan Ground Self Defense Force), JMSDF (Japan 
Maritime Self Defense Force), and JASDF (Japan Air Self Defense Force). Table 
2.1 shows the initial military power in the Self Defense Force (SDF). 
 
Table 2.1 Initial Military Power in the Self Defense Force (1954)8 
 
Ground forces Naval forces Air forces 
(personnel) (personnel) (tonnage) (personnel) (combat aircraft) 
139,000 16,000 58,000 6,700 150 
 
2. Constitution of Japan 
The Constitution of Japan was promulgated in 1946 to replace the former 
Meiji Constitution and came into effect in 1947. In the process of drafting the 
constitution, opinion and direction by the GHQ was strongly reflected. Therefore, 
the constitution emphasized “that sovereign power resides with the people” in the 
preface and more specifically described the “renunciation of war” in Article 9. 
Article 9 of the constitution stated that “the Japanese people forever 
renounce war” and “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will 
never be maintained.” However, in reality, the Japanese government politically 
decided to establish the National Police Reserve at the beginning of the Korean 
War in 1950.  Furthermore, the Self Defense Force was obviously born with 
equipment and as an armed military in 1954. (The full text of Article 9 follows.) 
CHAPTER II: RENUNCIATION OF WAR Article 9: Aspiring 
sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the 
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the 
nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling 
international disputes. 2) In order to accomplish the aim of the  
 
 
                                            
8 Tamura. 
10 
preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war 
potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the 
state will not be recognized.  
The Japanese government explained a relationship between the 
constitution and the right of self-defense: the idea of pacifism is enshrined in the 
Constitution, of which Article 9 sets forth the renunciation of war, non-possession 
of war potential, and a denial of the right of belligerence by the state. 
Nonetheless, as long as Japan remains an independent nation, these provisions 
do not deny the inherent right of self-defense.9 Thus, the government insists that 
the right of self defense is not against the principle of the Constitution. “The lack 
of constitutional legitimacy for the defense forces complicates government efforts 
to formulate a defense strategy- or to justify defense buildup plans.”10 
According to the latest public opinion survey by the Cabinet office in 
February 2006, 69.4% of the people recognized a mission for the Self Defense 
Forces as the national security and agree with the government’s interpretation to 
retain the right of self defense.11  However, the appropriate size and scope for 
the self defense force is a highly controversial question. The government noted, 
“Self defense capability that Japan is permitted to possess under the Constitution 
is limited to the minimum necessary level” and the possession of “offensive 
weapons” such as long-range strategic bombers or attack aircraft carriers is 
prohibited. As an example of the extremes the government has gone to in 
enforcing these restrictions, when the JASDF introduced the F-4E fighter based 
on the perceived threat from nearby countries, the bombing and air-refueling 
capabilities were removed at extra cost.12 For similar reasons, the JMSDF gave 
up on building an aircraft carrier. 
                                            
9 Defense Agency, ed., Defense of Japan 2006 (Tokyo: Gyosei, 2006), 
http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2006/w2006_00.html (accessed April 2007). 
10 Joseph P. Keddell, The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External 
Pressures (Armonk, N.Y: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), 21. 
11 Defense Agency, ed., Defense of Japan 2006. 
12 Hisahiko Okazaki, A Grand Strategy for Japanese Defense (Lanham: University Press of 
America, 1986), 81. 
11 
The Constitution of Japan has not been amended since it was established 
in 1947, even though there were some opportunities for change when the 
security environment became more unstable. Even though 55.5% of the people 
considered the necessity to amend the Constitution, the hurdle to review has 
been high and fought with political controversy.13 It is seen as a sanctuary where 
nobody trespasses to preserve the Constitution as it was established. Therefore, 
instead of an amendment, the government only changed its interpretation and its 
application in order to justify the SDF activities. The arguments on the 
relationship between the Constitution and the SDF are still a serious issue within 
the nation and the political position of the SDF is very ambiguous. 
3. Organizational Structure 
The Constitution, especially Article 9, makes the defense organizational 
structure seem distorted. The inconsistency between the Constitution and the 
real world makes the defense structure very complex. However, on January 8, 
2007, the Japanese government raised the Defense Agency to the status of the 
Department of Defense. Before that, the Defense Agency was one of the 
agencies of the Cabinet office.  
Before promotion to ministry level, the Prime Minister would still appoint 
the minister of defense, and the whole defense organization remained less than 
an actual ministry. Thus, the minister was technically one of the cabinet members, 
but remained in fact head of an agency of the Cabinet office in the Cabinet. The 
difference between ministry and agency is huge in terms of political power, 
authority, and influence. The Defense Agency has been seen as the government 
office for managing the affairs of the Self Defense Forces (SDF), rather than the 
national security affairs.14 Thus, it had been possible for the bureaucrats of the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF) to exercise stronger influence over defense plans than 
politicians.  
                                            
13 “Public Survey on the Constitution,” Yomiuri Shimbun, March 2006 
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/fe6100/koumoku/20060404.htm (accessed March 2007). 
14 Keddell, 19. 
12 
Even though the Defense Agency was not a ministry, the defense budget 
was submitted to the (MOF) by the Defense Agency. Thus, from the view of 
public finance, the Defense Agency was regarded as a “ministry.” This political 
ambiguity affected defense budget negotiations between the MOF and the 
Defense Agency. In Japanese politics, the budget approval process, or the 
decisions on dividing up the pie, is always a matter of power. In fact, the MOF 
bureaucrats reviewed the defense budget requests and controlled the overall 
size of the budget, so that the defense buildup plans and expenditures were 
restrained to a marginal pace.15  The promotion of the Defense Agency to the 
Ministry of Defense in FY 2007 resolved, after more than fifty years, a big 
problem related to national security. Appendix A shows an organizational change 
before and after promotion.  
Even though the agency was raised to the department level, the internal 
organization structure did not change. Figure 2.1 shows the organizational chart 
for the JMSDF. The JMSDF consists of the Self Defense Fleet and five Regional 
Districts. The Self Defense Fleet is responsible for the defense of the areas 
around Japan primarily through mobile operations by utilizing key units such as 
the Fleet Escort Force, the Fleet Air Force, and the Submarine Force. In addition, 
there are five regional districts that primarily guard their assigned areas and 
support the Self Defense Fleet.16  Therefore, it can be said that the Self Defense 
Fleet is a major work force within the JMSDF.  In particular, the Fleet Escort 
Force provides the primary units to secure the nation. In fact, the newest ships 
join the Fleet Escort Force first. The ships in the regional district are received 
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Figure 2.1 Organization Chart for the JMSDF17 
 
B. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. NAVY 
1. Japan's Independence and the U.S. - Japan Security Treaty 
In September 1951, the Allied Powers and Japan signed the Treaty of 
Peace with Japan at the San Francisco Peace Treaty Conference.  
Simultaneously, Japan and the U.S. concluded the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty at 
the Presidio Army Base in San Francisco. Based on these security treaties, the 
allied occupation forces in Japan withdrew.  Since that time, U.S. forces have 
been stationed in Japan under the United States Forces Japan (USFJ). In 1960, 
the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was revised. This “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation  
 
                                            
17 Defense Agency, ed., Defense of Japan 2006. 
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and Security between the United States and Japan” was signed in Washington 
DC. The initial period was set for one year, but the treaty is still in effect without 
abrogation.  
Under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the U.S. promises to defend Japan, 
and the JSDF is authorized to conduct cooperative operations with the U.S. 
Forces in case of emergency. However, as Duncan McCargo points out, “Japan 
made no such pledge to come to the aid of the United States. The supposedly 
‘mutual’ treaty was entirely one-sided.” 18  This distortion is still arguable at 
present, especially since Japan has attained such a high level of military and 
economic power. 
In 1978, the U.S. and the Japanese government agreed to “a de facto 
transformation of the mutual security arrangement in the form of a set of 
Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation.”19 The aim of these guidelines 
was described as to enhance the effectiveness and credibility among the two 
countries.20  In addition, the guidelines defined some concrete activities such as 
cooperation under normal circumstances, actions in response to an armed attack 
against Japan, and cooperation in areas surrounding Japan. In accordance with 
the JMSDF improvement of ability and equipment, the relationship between the 
U.S. and Japan was reviewed and reinforced for the national security.  
 The relationship between the JMSDF and the U.S. Navy has been very 
strong from the beginning with mutual respect and mutual reliance. During the 
late 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. pressed the Japanese to assume a wider role as 
a strategic partner in the defense of Pacific Asia.21 
 
 
                                            
18 Duncan McCargo, Contemporary Japan. 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004),   
184. 
19 Hitoshi Abe, Mineyuki Shindo, and Sadafumi Kawato, The Government and Politics of 
Japan (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1994), 105. 
20 Defense Agency, ed., Defense of Japan 2006. 
21 McCargo, 184. 
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2. Interoperability between the U.S. Navy and the JMSDF 
Due to the support by the U.S. Navy, the JMSDF has increased its 
capabilities in both qualitative and quantitative terms. The National Defense 
Program Guideline for FY2005 and after (NDPG) clearly stated, “The close and 
cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States, based on the 
Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, continues to play an important role for the 
security of Japan as well as for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.” In 
order to strengthen interoperability, the JMSDF usually conducts combined 
exercises with the U.S. Navy, not only to promote closer communication and 
keep harmonious relations between the U.S. Navy and the JMSDF, but also to 
improve the level of tactical skill. In addition, every year the JMSDF dispatches 
its escort ships, submarines, and aircraft to the U.S. to brush up on their 
proficiency by making use of the U.S. Navy’s training installations. 
In FY2005, joint exercises were conducted as follows (See Table 2.2): 
 
Table 2.2 Record of Joint Exercises in FY2005 
 
Scale Exercise 





Sea area to south-
west of Japan 
Vessels: 2 
Aircraft: a few 
Vessels: 2 


















Aircraft: a few 
Vessels: 10 












Medical training Oct 26, 2005 
Yokosuka Naval 
























College Personnel: 30 Personnel: 40 
Source: Defense of Japan 2006, Defense Agency 
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One of the major joint exercises is the Rim of the Pacific Exercise, 
RIMPAC, which is conducted biennially (every even year) under the leadership of 
the U.S. Navy. The JMSDF has participated in RIMPAC since 1980. The 
exercise is held with the primary objective to “Enhance key war fighting skill sets 
and coalition interoperability.” RIMPAC 2006 brought together military forces 
from Australia, Canada, Chile, Peru, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United 
Kingdom and the United States.22 
The JMSDF and the U.S. Navy have enhanced their interoperability 
through these exercises. At the present time, the strong relationship between the 
two countries provides a consistent level of security around the Pacific-Asia 
region. Consequently, it follows that Japanese defense policy is made based on 
the U.S. relationship. 
3. The Japan- U.S. Alliance of the New Century  
As the international security environment changes, so too does the 
relationship between the U.S. and Japan. During the Cold War era, the JMSDF 
was expected to play a role in containing Soviet sea power in the northwest 
Pacific. Thus, the JMSDF developed its Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) 
capability so that the JMSDF could complement the U.S. Navy strategy in the 
Pacific. However, because of the end of the Cold War and Japanese economic 
growth, the U.S. expressly stated that “Japan needed to assume greater 
responsibility for regional security around its immediate territorial waters.” 23 
Furthermore, Japan was accused of enjoying a “free ride” in defense terms, due 
to the outdated and distorted mutual security treaty.24 
The Gulf War (1990-1991) made a significant change in the Japanese 
defense policy. The U.S. government strongly encouraged Japan to cooperate in 
the war and to contribute toward the war expenditures. The Japanese responded 
                                            
22 COMTHIRDFLT Public Affairs, “Rim of the Pacific Exercise 2006,” 
http://www.c3f.navy.mil/RIMPAC_2006/about_rimpac.htm (accessed March 2007). 
23 McCargo, 185. 
24 Masaaki Honma, Introduction to the Study of Modern Public Finance [GENDAI ZAISEI 
NYUMON], 2nd ed. (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsya, 1994), 404. 
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with a payment of $13 billion. Because the law was not settled yet to permit SDF 
activity on the battlefield, no personnel were allocated to the Gulf War effort.  
Because of the Constitution the Japanese government could not do anything 
further. Despite the money Japan committed, the other coalition forces attacking 
Iraq did not appreciate the Japanese contribution. Americans were dissatisfied 
and accused Japan of checkbook diplomacy, and the Kuwaitis, when thanking 
their liberators, did not mention Japan.25   
Such a humiliation prompted the Japanese government to shed what 
some Japanese criticized as irresponsible one-country pacifism.26 At this time, 
the Japanese government realized that the money they contributed to the war 
effort did not garner respect from the international community.27  In fact, the 
attitude of other countries toward Japan was negative and Japan was accused of 
not providing full support because they did not send personnel.28  Consequently, 
the Japanese government changed its defense policy to become more deeply 
involved in international affairs. It intended to activate the SDF outside Japan 
waters. The Japanese government passed a law allowing the SDF to participate 
in United Nations peacekeeping operations a year after the Gulf War. 
After September 11, 2001, the Japanese media reported the statement 
made by Richard Armitage, the United States Deputy Secretary of State, to the 
Ambassador of Japan to the United States of America: “it was crucially important 
that the Japanese flag fly besides the Stars and Stripes in the war on terror.”29 
This statement reminded the Japanese government of the negative publicity 
received during and after the Gulf War. “There was almost a kind of trauma 
among Japanese as a result of the reaction to what we did in the Gulf War. It was                                             
25 Louis D. Hayes, Introduction to Japanese Politics, 1st ed. (New York: Paragon House, 
1992), 265. 
26 Mike Mochizuki, “Japan Rethinks Pacifism,” Los Angeles Times, Sep 21, 2006. 
27 Doug Struck, “As Alliances Shift, Japan’s Military Role Is Widening,” The Washington Post, 
Sep 28, 2001. 
28 Sebastian Moffett and Martin Fackler, “Active Duty: Cautiously, Japan Returns to Combat, 
In Southern Iraq; Tokyo, Pressed by U.S., Threat From North Korea, Sheds Decades of Forced 
Pacifism; Redefining an Aircraft Carrier,” Wall Street Journal, Jan 2, 2004. 
29 Ayako Doi and Kim Willenson, “Sayonara to Japanese Pacifism?” Washington Post, Aug 
14, 2005. 
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a very bitter experience,” said Chikako Sekiba, a professor of Sacred Heart 
University in Tokyo.30 Japan finally decided to send the JMSDF fleet into the 
Indian Ocean in order to join Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Since 
December 2001, the JMSDF has contributed a total of 460,000 kl of ship fuel to 
naval vessels from eleven countries (See also Table 2.3). 
 










On June 29, 2006, President George W. Bush and Prime Minister 
Junichiro Koizumi of Japan announced a joint statement titled “The Japan – U.S. 
Alliance of the New Century.” It said that, “the President praised Japan’s 
humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as 
Japan’s support provided to coalition forces operating in the Indian Ocean.”32 
The role of the JMSDF has been transforming from participation in local 
                                            
30 Struck. 
31 “Support to the Coalition Forces,” Japan Maritime Self Defense Force, 2006, 
http://www.mod.go.jp/JMSDF/about/haken/hakenkyouryoku/sienkatudou/index.html (accessed 
March 2007). 
32 “The Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century,” White House 2006, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/20060629-2.html (accessed March 2007). 
Country Fuel Water Fuel for helicopters 
Canada 42 times  3 times 
France 79 times   
Germany 23 times  6 times 
Greek 10 times   
Italy 39 times  3 times 
Holland 11 times   
New Zealand 15 times   
Pakistan 110 times 88 times 11 times 
Spain 10 times   
U.K. 27 times  2 times 
U.S.A. 339 times  30 times 
Total times 705 times 88 times 55 times 
Total amount 460,000 kl 5,180 tons 870 kl 
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exercises to that of worldwide cooperation. As a result, the mission of the JMSDF 
has expanded to meet the goals of the new alliance worldwide.   
C. TRANSITION OF THE DEFENSE STRATEGY 
1. Defense Policy 
The Japanese defense policy is based on the "Basic Policy for National 
Defense," which was adopted by the National Defense Council in 1957. 
According to this policy, “The objective of national defense is to prevent direct 
and indirect aggression, but once invaded, to repel such aggression thereby 
preserving the independence and peace of Japan founded upon democratic 
principles.”33 In order to achieve this objective, the government has advocated 
some more detailed principles since the SDF was formed. The most specific 
characteristic among the principles is the “exclusively defense-oriented” policy. 
McCargo explains that exclusively defense-oriented means “they [the Japanese 
government or SDF]: 
• Can only act if attacked; 
• Must take only minimum actions required for defense; and 
• The size of their capability must be limited to the minimum 
necessary for defense – that is, there should be no offensive or 
strategic weapons.”34 
However, the security environment around Japan is changing remarkably, 
jolted by North Korea’s missile tests and nuclear test. In fact, some Japanese 
politicians urged the beginning of a debate on developing a capability to hit the 
enemy base before they launch a missile.35 Japan does not possess the ability to 
strike an overseas base, but North Korea’s missile test has revived discussion 
over whether it should and whether doing so would violate the U.S.-drafted 
                                            
33 “NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINE, FY 2005 and after,” Defense Agency, 
2005, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/policy/f_work/taikou05/index_e01.htm (accessed March 2007). 
34 McCargo, 184. 
35 “Japan LDP Debates Ability to Hit Enemy Bases,” Defense News, posted August 4, 2006, 
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2001032&C=asiapac (accessed March 2007). 
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pacifist constitution. This constitution has previously been interpreted as allowing 
a military solely for self-defense purposes.36 
The arguments for possessing pre-emptive strike capability are being 
formulated and discussed at the present time.  As John Feffer, co-director of 
Foreign Policy in Focus at the International Relations Center, Albuquerque, N.M., 
points out, “After the 1998 Taepodong launch, the Japanese public certainly 
became more hawkish on North Korea. But supporting a stronger defense is a far 
cry from supporting pre-emptive strikes.”37  It seems to take a long time to reach 
any conclusions. However, the Japanese government intends to make the best 
decision under the limitations of the Constitution. These recent events have 
resulted in Japan participating in a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program with 
the U.S. Additionally, the JMSDF introduced the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block 
4 missile system for Aegis destroyers. Therefore, the Aegis destroyers have 
assumed a significant role for Japan’s defense strategy in the future.  
2. Defense Strategy and Defense Budget Policy 
Based on the “Basic Policy for National Defense,” the Japanese 
government decided to develop a defense capability as necessary for self-
defense, with regard to the nation’s resources and the prevailing domestic 
situation. The defense strategy was laid out in the Defense Buildup Plan of 1958 
and revised three times during the period 1958-1976. The emphasis of this plan 
was to promote substantial preparedness both quantitatively and qualitatively. 38 
There have been two major turning points in terms of the relationship 
between defense strategy and the defense budget. The first one was in 1976. A 
nominal 1% of GNP limit on defense spending was adopted by the National 
Defense Council and approved by the Cabinet. Looking back at the previous year, 
FY1975, the necessary defense capability was considered to be almost satisfied; 
                                            
36 “Japan LDP Debates Ability to Hit Enemy Bases.” 
37 “Japan Debates Pre-Emptive Strike,” Defense News, posted August 14, 2006, 
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2016893&C=asiapac (accessed March 2007). 
38 Satsuki Katayama, “National Defense Program Outline in and after FY2005 and Mid-Term 
Defense Program (FY2005-FY2009),” The Finance, February, 2005, 40-53. 
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thus, the government ceased to formulate a defense buildup plan covering a 
fixed time as it did before. Instead, it was decided to adopt a “single fiscal year 
formula” by which the required decisions would be made annually.  However, the 
government realized the importance of setting a ceiling on defense expenditures. 
Thus, they applied the framework of the 1% of GNP. Figure 2.2 shows a 
transition of defense strategy since 1958. 
 
FY 1958    1976 1977  1986 1987  1990 
Basic Policy for National Defense 
(Adopted on May 20, 1957 by the National Defense Council and the Cabinet) 
National Defense Program Outline 
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National Defense Program 
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Framework of total expense 
set forth in the program 
 
Figure 2.2 Transition of Defense Strategy39 
 
Until the end of 1986, this framework was effective for putting the brakes 
on spiraling defense spending. In 1986, in the process of the compilation of the 
FY 1987 budget, the defense budget exceeded the 1% framework. Therefore, 
the government ceased using this framework. Instead, the defense budget limit  
 
                                            
39 Katayama, 40-53. 
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was described in the Mid-Term Defense Program as the total amount for that 
period. In other words, the framework of total expense was set forth in the Mid-
Term Program.    
The second turning point came in 2004. The main issue was a transition to 
reduce JSDF expenditures. The Cabinet approved the "National Defense 
Program Guideline for FY2005 and after" (NDPG) and the “Mid-Term Defense 
Program FY2005-FY2009" (MTDP) on December 10, 2004. According to the 
NDPG, “The Government of Japan will rationalize and streamline personnel, 
equipment, and operations so as to attain greater results with the limited 
resources that are available.”40 Limited resources implied budget and manpower; 
as a result, the hardware and scope of JSDF operations would be significantly 
reduced. As for the JMSDF, the destroyers were reduced to 47 and P-3C aircraft 
to 150. This change was made not only for the overall financial reasons, but also 
for specific military internal and financial reasons.   
3. Fleet Concept 
Japan relies on foreign countries for most of the materials that are needed 
to produce Japanese manufactured goods.  In particular, energy resources are 
highly dependent on imports using tankers. For example, 99.7% of oil 
consumption and 96.3% of natural gas consumption is imported.41 Therefore, 
sea-lane defense is considered one of the major missions for the JMSDF.  
In order to maintain the maritime security, the JMSDF operates the Self 
Defense Fleet as a mobile force. In particular, the Fleet Escort Force is the 
center of Japanese sea power. Traditionally, the Fleet Escort Force consists of 
four Escort Flotillas and each Escort Flotilla is assigned eight ships, including two 
guided missile destroyers (DDGs). Because there are four flotillas, the JMSDF 
has an operational plan in which one flotilla is always on duty, one flotilla is in a 
readiness condition, one flotilla is in training, and the last one is in 
                                            
40 Defense Agency, ed., Defense of Japan 2006. 
41 “Japanese Energy Resources,” Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation, 
http://www.jogmec.go.jp/j_resourse/index.html (accessed March 2007). 
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maintenance.42 In addition, eight antisubmarine helicopters are assigned to each 
flotilla. These eight ships with eight helicopters are referred to as the “Eight by 
Eight Fleet Concept.”  
With regard to the Coast Guard mission, five Regional Districts cover the 
entire Japanese coastline and inshore waters. Even though the newest ships are 
assigned to the Escort Flotilla first and the older ships are delivered to the 
Regional Districts, the oldest one was built in 1982 and the most recent ship was 
built in 1987.  
The "National Defense Program Guideline for FY2005 and after" (NDPG) 
provides guidelines for a big transition in the Fleet Concept. Units for mobile 
operations units will be consolidated into eight divisions (one division consisting 
of four vessels) to be able to respond to contingencies swiftly and continuously.  
Units for regional district units will be changed to allocate one unit to each of the 
five security areas to reflect the current security environment.43 Figure 2.3 shows 
a future posture of mobile operation unit and regionally deployed unit. As a result, 
NDPG directs a reduction of seven destroyers that will draw down the total to 47 
from 54.  
 
 
                                            
42 Defense Agency, ed., Defense of Japan 1992 (Tokyo: Gyosei, 2006), 
http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/1992/w1992_02.html (accessed March 2007). 




Figure 2.3  Future Posture of Units44 
 
D. SUMMARY 
The Japanese defense history after WWII cannot be described without 
including the relationship with the U.S. The two countries have been deeply 
involved in an effort to build up the Asia-Pacific region security environment. 
However, as time has passed, the relationship has transformed from 
complementary to a full partnership. The JMSDF developed its maritime 
                                            
44 Defense Agency, ed., Defense of Japan 2006. 
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fundamental forces in the 1960s with U.S. Naval support.  During the late 1970s 
and 1980s, the U.S. pressed the Japanese to assume a wider role as a strategic 
partner in the defense of Pacific Asia. At the end of the Cold War, winning the 
war on terrorism became a mutual objective and one of common interest. Now, 
based on a bilateral relationship the U.S. and Japan stand together to work for 
regional and global cooperation. The JMSDF is expected to accomplish a wide 
range of missions to not only secure the nation but also be active all over the 
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III. DATA PRESENTATION – SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM OF 
THE JMSDF  
A. JAPANESE BUDGET OVERVIEW 
1. Characteristics 
The Japanese budget system is managed in conformity with the 
Constitution and the Public Finance law. The Prime Minister must submit a draft 
budget each fiscal year to the Diet for approval, and then implement the 
approved budget in an appropriate manner for the benefit of the public. With 
respect to the shipbuilding program, two specific characteristics about the 
Japanese budget system are fiscal year and ‘continued expense (planned multi-
year expenditures).’ 
The fiscal year in Japan begins on April 1 and ends on March 31 of the 
following year. The budget is compiled for each fiscal year (the principle of 
preparing the budget on an annual basis). Also, in principle, the revenues from 
each fiscal year must cover the expenditures for that fiscal year. With the 
exception of the continued expenses, contracts and outlays authorized by the 
budget for each fiscal year must be made or disbursed within that fiscal year.45 
This annual fiscal year system has the advantage of keeping the fiscal 
condition ‘healthy’ because the relationship between revenues and expenditures 
is very clear and predictable. However, on the flip side, there is a disadvantage in 
that a large amount of end-of-year spending could be inefficient and wasteful with 
the notion of ‘use it, or lose it.’ Additionally, according to the Public Finance Law, 
it follows that annual year-based budgets do not allow use of the budget evenly 
across the fiscal year.46 Therefore, in order to solve this dilemma, planned multi-
year budget dollars are used to cover the long-period projects such as 
shipbuilding. 
                                            
45 “Understanding the Japanese Budget,” Budget Bureau of Ministry of Finance, 2004, 
http://www.mof.go.jp/english/budget/brief/2004/2004b_01.htm (accessed March 2007). 
46 Public Finance Law (1947). 
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Continued expenses contain items for which the government makes 
payments over a period of several years, the maximum period being five years. 
These payments are for projects in construction, production, and other areas. 
Prior Diet approval is required for a multi-year expense item, and the Diet 
specifies the total amount of expenditure as well as the annual allotments. 
However, in recent years, continued expenses have been used only for the 
construction of destroyers and submarines for the JMSDF.47 
2. Fiscal Situation 
Since the end of WWII, the Japanese economy has been shifting within a 
boom and bust cycle. In particular, the Fourth Arab-Israeli War (1973) caused a 
worldwide energy crisis that damaged the Japanese economy. The steep rise in 
oil prices led to economic turmoil and was referred to as the Oil Shock. 
Consequently, the inflation rate rose rapidly, reaching 19.2% in 1974, and the 
consumer price index (CPI) increased by 23% (Figure 3.1). The government 
imposed a cut in the use of oil, and as a result, pushed the economy toward a 
recession. 48   In FY1976, the government issued 3.5 trillion yen of deficit—
financing bonds to cover insufficient tax revenue. Since then, the Japanese fiscal 
structure has relied heavily on government bonds. 
Since the bond dependency ratio (the ratio of bond issuance to total 
expenditures) increased to 34.7% in 1979, the government instituted fiscal 
structural reform by cutting down expenses such as a “zero ceiling budget in 
1982” (the same level of budget as the previous year) and a “minus ceiling 
budget formulation in 1983” (a smaller budget than the previous year) in the 
ministry budget request.49 While the ceiling policy had many exceptions including 
the defense budget, it effectively signaled the government’s determination to 
pursue a tight budget policy.50 However, continuously increasing outstanding 
                                            
47 “Understanding the Japanese Budget.” 
48 W.G. Beasley, The Rise of Modern Japan (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), 249. 
49 Honma, 403. 
50 Allen Schick, Fiscal Externalities in U.S. and Japanese Budget Policies (Maryland: 
University of Maryland at College Park, 1996), 21. 
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government bonds to support the Japanese economy has led to a deteriorating 
fiscal condition that has worsened year by year. Figure 3.2 shows a relationship 
between bond issues and bond dependency. The bond dependency rate 
significantly increased from 1990. 
 
Figure 3.1 Consumer Price Index51 
 
In the cycle of boom and bust, the latter half of the 1980s is known as the 
age of the bubble economic boom. Stocks and land prices showed remarkable 
increases and overseas investment from Japan increased rapidly. Japan became 
known as the world’s largest creditor country.52 Meanwhile, the economic boom 
was a prelude to the next long-term recession, called the lost decade, from 1991 
to 2000. 
While the fiscal condition showed an indication of improvement during the 
bubble economy, outstanding bonds and bond dependency rates started to 
increase again. According to the MOF estimate, the amount of long-term debt 
outstanding—the sum of central government long-term debt outstanding and 
local governments’ long-term debt outstanding—was expected to reach 
approximately 775 trillion yen by the end of FY2006, which would be 150.8% of 
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GDP.53 Former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi advocated structural reforms 
without exception to put Japanese finances in order, the so-called “Koizumi 
Structural Reform.” 54  Therefore, every ministry was requested to reduce 
expenditures. The alternative was serious financial trouble for Japan in the near 




Figure 3.2 Trends of Bond Issues and Bond Dependency55 
 
3. Trends 
The General Account Budget, commonly referred to as the budget, is the 
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54 “Koizumi Reforms,” pamphlet by the Cabinet Office, 2004, http://www.keizai-
shimon.go.jp/explain/pamphlet/0404.pdf (accessed February 2006). 
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Account are classified by major government programs, such as social security, 
education and science, and national defense. All national taxes are included as 
revenues in the General Account.56  
Based on the economic background, annual expenditures in the General 
Account had been increasing until FY2000. In that year, the budget was at 85 
trillion yen, which was unparalleled in history. However, because of the extremely 
large amount of outstanding government bonds, the General Account became 
stagnant after FY2001. In FY2006, the General Account was only 79.68 trillion 
yen, which was almost the same level as ten years prior. Figure 3.3 shows the 
percentage of tax revenue in the General Account Budget. The rate of tax 
revenue in the General Account Budget significantly dropped from 1990 due to 
the long recession. Recently, however, the General Account Budget has 
increased slightly and steadied at approximately eighty trillion yen. This implies 
that the government bonds have sustained the fiscal condition in recent years. 
 
Figure 3.3 Trends of General Account Budget57 
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In spite of a heavy debt, the budget has not gone bankrupt because of the 
relative growth of GDP. The GDP growth rate was still positive among the oil 
shocks, and only in FY1998 through FY2002 was there negative growth during 
consecutive years. Figure 3.4 shows the Nominal GDP and growth rate. Viewing 
the GDP only, it can be said there has been a rapid growth in GDP since the end 
of WWII, but no overall economic growth is recognized.   
Finally, it can be concluded that the problem of the Japanese fiscal 
condition derives from the outstanding government bonds of over 546 trillion yen. 
Even though the tax revenue has increased, it follows that erosion due to the 
interest payments for the debt negatively affects the General Account Budget. 
 
Figure 3.4 Nominal GDP and Growth Rate58 
(Note FY1955-1993: 68SNA basis, FY1994-2005: 93SNA basis) 
 
B. DEFENSE BUDGET 
1. Trends 
The defense budget stopped growing in 1998. Since 1955 the defense 
budget had increased in consonance with the corresponding Japanese economic 
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growth. However, currently the economy, as well as the defense budget, is not 
expected to grow rapidly due to the economic situation. 59  Because of the 
increase in budget deficit in FY 1975, the Japanese government has set a lower 
budget ceiling in budget requests by ministry and agency.60 Figure 3.5 shows the 
trend in the defense budget and a relationship between GDP and the defense 













































(Note Defense budget: original budget. GDP: initial forecasted GDP) 
Figure 3.5 Trends in the Defense Budget and Defense Budget As a 
Percent of GNP61 
 
The defense budget has remained under 1% of GNP except during the 
first ten years of the Self Defense Force (SDF). This occurred even though the 
government changed from a framework of 1% of the GNP to a framework of total 
expense set forth in the mid-term defense program. The ratio of the defense 
budget to the GDP was highest in 1955, at 1.78%. However, due to the pacifism 
principle in the constitution, the defense budget was restrained in concert with 
the GDP growth. The ratio reached the lowest level at 0.79% in 1970, after the 
government set the guideline as 1% of the GNP for the defense budget. 
                                            
59 “Reform Issues 2007 for the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy,” Council on 
Economic and Fiscal Policy, posted January 18, 2007, 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/keizai/kakugi/070125kettei.pdf (accessed February 2007). 
60 Kozo Yamamura and Yasukichi Yasuba, The Political Economy of Japan (Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press, 1987), 209. 
61 Defense Agency, ed., Defense of Japan 2006. 
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In 1987, the GNP ratio again exceeded the 1% guideline. Masaaki Honma 
pointed out that the main reason for exceeding 1% was a diplomatic issue 
between the U.S. and Japan. Due to trade frictions, the U.S. accused Japan of 
being a “free rider” under the umbrella of U.S. defenses.62 Japan’s trade surplus 
with the U.S. amounted to $52.1 billion in 1987. Due to this imbalance, 
controversy over the burden of defense expense arose quickly within the U.S. 
government. It was viewed in Washington that a more cooperative Japan could 
alleviate the political pressure from special interests such as the automobile 
industry.63 Consequently, the defense budget was increased to over 1% of the 
GNP to settle the controversy and show Japan’s willingness to increase 
expenditures for national defense. 
 












Total Budget ¥24.23 trillion ¥25.01 trillion ¥24.24 trillion 
Personal and Provisions  
Expense ¥10.39 trillion ¥11.11 trillion ¥10.61 trillion 
Nonpersonnel Expense  ¥13.84 trillion ¥13.90 trillion ¥13.63 trillion 
Others* ¥110 billion * ¥150 billion * ¥100 billion * 
Note * Provisions for these expenses will be made on the approval of the Security 
Council in cases where it is deemed necessary to respond to unpredictable 
situations in the future.  
 
Instead of 1% of the GNP framework, the framework of total expense was 
set forth in the Mid-term Defense Program (MTDP) starting in 1987. Current 
MTDP (FY2005-Fy2009) as shown in Table 3.1 indicates that the total amount of 
the defense budget shall not exceed approximately ¥24.24 trillion in total budget 
                                            
62 Honma, 404. 
63 Hayes, 269. 
64 “Mid-term Defense Program (FY2005-FY2009),” Defense Agency, 2005, 
http://www.mod.go.jp/j/defense/policy/17taikou/topix_index.html (accessed February 2007). 
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using FY2004 pricing. The Table also indicates that the annual defense budget is 
not expected to grow at least until 2009, because the maximum amount has 
been set and is never permitted to change unless there is emergency legislation. 
In other words, 14.40 trillion yen was spent already from FY2005 to FY2007 
(FY2007 is estimated); therefore, 9.84 trillion yen is considered a maximum 
defense expenditure for FY2008 and FY2009. 
2. Structure 
The defense budget is classified into three categories: personnel and food 
provisions expenses, general material expenses, and obligatory outlay expenses. 
Personnel and food provisions expenses cover such items as pay and meals for 
the SDF personnel. General material expenses are paid under current-year 
contracts that cover the repair and maintenance of equipment, purchase of fuel, 
education and training for SDF personnel. Obligatory outlay expenses are paid 
for continuing programs that were approved in the preceding fiscal year. Figure 
3.6 shows, for example, the structure of the defense budget for nine consecutive 
years by three categories. 
For example, according to the above classification, the breakdown of 
defense-related expenditures for FY2006 is as follows: expenses for the current-
year personnel and food provisions account for ¥2,134 billion; expenses for the 
current-year obligatory outlays account for ¥1,754 billion; and expenses for the 
general materials account for ¥926 billion. Obligatory outlay is paid under 
previously concluded contracts such as destroyer shipbuilding.65 Due to the five-
year maximum for continued expense, obligatory outlay is also retroactive to five 
years.66 Material expenses include both general material expenses and first-year 
payment of continued expense. 
 
                                            
65 Defense Agency, ed., Defense of Japan 2006. 
66 Public Finance Law (1947). 
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Note:        ; this means continued expenses that are carried over from previous 
year contracts, such as the shipbuilding account. 
Figure 3.6 Structure of the Defense Budget (in billion yen)67 
 
In FY2006, the Ministry of Defense could make contracts for 2.7 trillion 
yen; 926 billion yen would be paid under FY2006 current year contracts; 1,794 
billion yen was carried over to the following four years like a shipbuilding program. 
In other words, a total of three trillion yen would be carried over from the previous 
years contracts as accounts payable. Similar to the General Account Budget of 
the government, the accounts payable in the defense budget are required to 
decrease in order to sustaining the defense policy.68 
The Ministry of Defense defines the classification method shown above as 
“Classification by Expense.” Figure 3.7 shows a trend of the defense budget 
based on the classification by expense. This figure shows that the ratio of 
obligatory expense has not changed in recent years. 
                                            



























Figure 3.7 Classification by Expense69 
 
Furthermore, mandatory expenses short-term (including personnel and 
provisions, and obligatory outlay) account for 81 percent of the defense budget 
(see Figure 3.8). Note that 37% of that amount are multi-year expenses derived 
from the previous planned expenditure through signed contracts. The remaining 
19% is used for General Material requirements for a certain fiscal year. In other 
words, because the previous contracts and personnel expenses account for over 
80%, discretionary expense is under 20%. This results in a defense budget with 
little flexibility to start any new projects and a major roadblock to change.  
 
Mandatory: Discretionary    81: 19 
Figure 3.8 Defense Budget FY2006 Classification by Expense70 
                                            












C. SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM 
1. Ship Inventory 
The budget uses the term “escort ship” for a warship, which includes all 
kinds of warships such as a DD (Defense Destroyer), DDG (Guided Missile 
Defense Destroyer), DDH (Helicopter Defense Destroyer) and DE (Destroyer 
Escort). The total number of destroyers was the highest in 1993 at sixty-nine.  
However, it decreased afterward to a level of fifty-six destroyers in 2006. 
Eventually, the National Defense Program Guideline after 2005 determined that 
the JMSDF should reduce the number of destroyers to forty-seven from the 
current fifty-six destroyers in the future “in order to make Japan’s new defense 
forces multi-functional, flexible and effective, and able to undertake diverse 
roles.”71 Thus, the JMSDF is now required to meet new challenges in an ever-











































Figure 3.9 Ship Inventory and Average Tonnage72 
 
Until 1993, average tonnage was proportional to the ship inventory. 
However, the relationship changed to an inverse proportion after that date (see 
                                            
71 “National Defense Program Guideline after FY2005,” Defense Agency, 2005,  
http://www.mod.go.jp/j/defense/policy/17taikou/topix_index.html (accessed February 2007). 
72 Kaijoujiei Shimbunsya, ed., JMSDF Ships and Aircrafts (Tokyo: Kaijoujiei Shimbunsya, 
2005), 134-152. 
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Figure 3.9). At the same time, the growth rate of the defense budget slowed 
down and turned into negative growth in 1998. Thus, due to the budget reduction, 
the number of new destroyers built decreased, but their displacements increased.  
Actually, the last of the DE type, with a relatively small displacement below 2,000 
tons, was built and commissioned in 1993, and the DE type destroyer never built 
at all after that. 
According to the “Regulation of Shipbuilding and Maintenance for the 
JMSDF,”73 the destroyer should be checked structurally at the twenty-year point 
and a determination made whether to keep it commissioned or to decommission 
the ship. Thereafter, it is checked every four years. However, the oldest active 
destroyer is now thirty-six years old. With special remodeling, the average 
service life of destroyers is now close to thirty years. The average service life of 
the active destroyers at the end of FY2006 reached nineteen years for fifty-six 
destroyers, which included fifteen destroyers over twenty-five years old. 
Therefore, in order to keep a certain number of destroyers to meet the JMSDF 
mission, the JMSDF will be required to keep a variety of obsolete ships that 
require a lot of money to maintain. On the contrary, in order to keep current with 
technology for the JMSDF, destroyers over twenty-five years old would have to 
be decommissioned.  This would be easy except that the JMSDF must balance 
this option with the minimum number of destroyers required to meet the mission. 
In spite of the fact that the JMSDF is involved in more complex missions 
that include a variety of evolutions, the major equipment for the JMSDF 
“destroyers” is in fact decreasing. Recently, the JMSDF has been building large, 
multipurpose destroyers such as the DDH (13,500 tons) in FY2004 and FY 2006, 
for a cost of ¥105.7 billion each. The next chapter examines how the destroyer 
building policy affects the JMSDF maritime strategy and posture. 
 
 
                                            
73 Ministry of Defense Code 43, Regulation of shipbuilding and maintenance for the JMSDF, 
1957. 
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2. Shipbuilding Account 
The JMSDF has developed a new ship type every 7 to 10 years on 
average.74 The cost of almost every class of destroyers has increased year by 
year. This logically implies that the weapon systems installed on destroyers have 
become more expensive with technology and inflation each year.  As Shinji 
Tsukigi stated, initiating a ship modernization with new computerized systems 
and new missile defense systems caused a significant increase in shipbuilding 
costs during the late 1970’s.75 (See Tables 3.2 - 3.5) 
 









Class Year Tonnage Number Built Average Cost 
Isuzu 1959 – 1961 1,490 4 ships ¥8,009 
Chikugo 1967 – 1973 1,470 11 ships ¥9,089 
Ishikari 1977 1,290 1 ship ¥15,583 
Yubari 1979 – 1980 1,470 2 ships ¥18,621 
Abukuma 1986 – 1989 2,000 6 ships ¥24,901 
 
 
                                            
74 Shinji Tsukigi, Katsuaki Terasawa, and Gregory G. Hildebrandt, “External and Internal 
Factors Shaping the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF)” (M.S. thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 1993), 16. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ministry of Finance, Budget Database (1953-2006), http://www1.mof.go.jp/data/index.htm 
(accessed February 2007). 































Class Year Tonnage Number Built Average Cost 
Harusame 1957 - 1958 1,800 4 ships ¥9,601 
Yamagumo 1962 – 1974 2,050 9 ships ¥12,666 
Hatusyuki 1977 – 1982 2,950 12 ships ¥37,529 
Asagiri 1983 - 1986 3,500 8 ships ¥41,605 
Murasame 1991 – 1997 4,550 9 ships ¥63,278 
Takanami 1998 - 2001 4,650 5 ships ¥66,247 
 
 










                                            
77 Ministry of Finance, Budget Database (1953-2006). 
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Class Year Tonnage Number Built Average Cost 
Amatsukaze 1960 3,050 1 ship ¥15,644 
Tachikaze 1971 – 1978 3,850 3 ships ¥43,711 
Hatakaze 1981 – 1983 4,600 2 ships ¥69,468 
Kongo 1988 – 1993 7,250 4 ships ¥113,906 
Atago 2002 -  7,700 2 ships ¥143,776 
 










Class Year Tonnage Number Built Average Cost 
Haruna 1968 - 1970 4,950 2 ships ¥23,128 
Shirane 1975 – 1976 5,200 2 ships ¥53,556 
16 DDH 2004 -  13,500 2 ships ¥102,844 
 
The Shipbuilding Account is a typical example of the continued expense 
(planned multi-year expense), where a portion of the total amount is paid in the 
current year and the remaining expenses are carried over to the following fiscal 
years (maximum five years). The rate of payment for each fiscal year may be 
changed based on the foreign exchange rate, timeline and progress in 
shipbuilding, or other reasons. Table 3.6 shows an example of the continued 
expenses for the latest Aegis DDG shipbuilding program between FY2002 and 
FY2006. 
The DDG shipbuilding program started in FY2002 with a total projected 
cost of ¥147 billion.  Approximately two billion yen, or 1.36% was paid in 2002 
                                            
79 Ministry of Finance, Budget Database (1953-2006). 






















(current-year contract) with the remaining ¥145 billion, or 98.64%, carried over to 
the following fiscal year as accounts payable. In FY2003, the JMSDF paid ¥11 
billion, ¥3 billion less than the planned ¥14 billion.  However, the total cost slightly 
decreased. Finally, the total cost of the DDG was only ¥142 billion in FY06¥, or a 
nominal 4% decrease. 
 
Table 3.6  Transition of payment plan for DDG shipbuilding80 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 
2002       2,139     14,566      41,477      70,535      18,754  ¥  147,471  
2003       2,139     11,823      44,269      70,535      18,756  ¥  147,523  
2004       2,139     11,823      37,057      72,629      18,761  ¥  142,410  





  2006       2,139     11,823      37,057      66,127      24,552  ¥  141,698  
Note; Every amount is million yen in Actual Payments and Planned Payments. Shaded 
blocks show actual payments. 
 
The significant character of the Shipbuilding Account is that, for the most 
part, the payment depends on the following year is planned payments as 
accounts payable. At present, 1% of the GNP framework is still considered as the 
maximum defense budget allocation. Under this scenario with a consistent GDP 
growth of over 5% (see Appendix B), the JMSDF could have had sufficient 
financial resources to manage the Shipbuilding Account without any financial 
difficulties.81 However, due to the long recession starting in 1991, the average 
GDP growth rate between 1991 and 2005 substantially decreased by 0.6% (see 
also Appendix B). Consequently, the defense budget, which has a close 
relationship with GDP, suffered severe financial problems with the stagnant GDP 
growth.   
3. Correlation with the Economy 
Because of the close relationship between the defense budget and the 
GDP, the defense budget has been influenced by the change in GDP. On the 
other hand the shipbuilding program, which usually continues for five years, has  
 
                                            
80 Ministry of Finance, Budget Database (1953-2006). 
81 Tsukigi, Terasawa, and Hildebrandt, 16. 
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been influenced by the change in prices during that period. There are two typical 
examples to show a correlation with the economy: the oil crisis in 1974 and the 
















Note: Year 2000 average = 100  
Figure 3.10 Corporate Goods Price Index82 
 
The oil crisis significantly inflated material costs for shipbuilding. Figure 
3.10 shows a corporate goods price index both iron products and petroleum 
products. As a result, the JMSDF was forced to cancel some shipbuilding 
programs in FY1974. Table 3.7 indicates a negative effect on the actual 
shipbuilding program. Because of the oil crisis, the shipbuilding account in the 
FY1973 program increased by 17 billion yen in the FY1974 planned payment. 
Therefore, the additional cost, increasing by 30% to 60% of shipbuilding costs, 
was paid from the shipbuilding account. The original cost included a DE and a 





                                            
82 “Corporate Goods Price Index (2000base),” Bank of Japan, posted April 12, 2007, 
http://www.boj.or.jp/en/type/stat/dlong/price/cgpi/index.htm (accessed April 2007). 
83 Tsukigi, Terasawa, and Hildebrandt, 16. 
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Cost (¥ K) 
Revised 
Cost (¥ K) 
Change 
Cost (¥ K) 
Change
(%) 
DDG ¥22,968,064 ¥30,136,794 ¥7,168,730 31.2 
DE ¥5,101,807 ¥8,131,297 ¥3,029,490 59.4 1973 
SS ¥9,808,169 ¥15,232,172 ¥5,424,033 55.3 
DD ¥11,610,697 ¥12,987,931 ¥1,377,234 11.9 
DE ¥6,117,329 ¥0 -¥6,117,329 -100 1974 
SS ¥11,037,005 ¥0 -¥11,037,005 -100 
 
Another example relates to the long recession between 1991 and 2000. 
The GDP growth rate was typically 3% to 5% during the 1970s and 1980s. 
However, after the New York stock market crash of October 19, 1987 (Black 
Monday), the Tokyo market collapsed by 14.9% on the following day.85 Moreover, 
the turning point came in “Black August” of 1990, when the value of the 
Japanese stock market fell by over 16% in a single month.86 Japanese real 
economic growth rate fell to 1% in 1992 and the average growth rate for the next 
ten years was only 0.68%.87 
 Considering the economic condition and the declining defense budget, 
the JMSDF did not request new shipbuilding in FY2005; this was the first time in 
the JMSDF’s history that no new destroyer was built. As a result, the total 
amount for the major equipment procurement was at its lowest point that year.88 
Furthermore, the shipbuilding account in the JMSDF seemed to be in a 
precarious situation from the late 1990s. The declining defense budget made it 
difficult to pay the portion of accounts payable in the shipbuilding account every 
year as scheduled. Therefore, the payments for certain fiscal years were reduced 
and deferred to later years. Table 3.8, for example, shows the transition of the 
payment plan for two DDs’ shipbuilding programs for a five-year period. 
                                            
84 Tsukigi, Terasawa, and Hildebrandt, 16. 
85 Takafusa Nakamura, The Postwar Japanese Economy : Itd Development and 
Structure,1937-1994, 2nd ed. (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1995), 272. 
86 Takashi Ito, The Japanese Economy (Mass.: MIT Press, 1992), 433. 
87 Duncan McCargo, 58. 
88 Okada, 44-55. 
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Table 3.8 Transition of Payment plan from FY 1998 (¥ million)89 
  Expenditure 
 Plan FY 98 FY 99 FY 00 FY 01 FY 02 Total 
FY 98 350 13,728 22,257 65,977 25,568 ¥127,880 
FY 99 350 7,351 28,756 65,067 26,579 ¥128,012 
FY 00 350 7,351 18,317 74,042 26,451 ¥126,510 
FY 01 350 7,351 18,317 60,341 40,518 ¥126,876 
DD 
(2) 
FY 02 350 7,351 18,317 60,341 40,653 ¥127,011 
   
 Plan FY 00 FY 01 FY 02 FY 03 FY 04 Total 
FY 00  99  2,817 16,415 31,268 13,472  ¥64,071 
FY 01 99  707 18,615 31,311 13,485  ¥64,217 
FY 02 99  707 13,648 37,037 13,578      ¥65,069 
FY 03 99           707    13,648    32,778      17,918      ¥65,150 
DD 
(1) 
FY 04 99           707    13,648    32,778      17,846     ¥65,077 
Note: Shaded blocks show actual payments. 
 
In FY 1998 two DDs were procured for an estimated total ¥127,880 million 
and ¥350 million was paid as the first-year payment. ¥13,728 million was 
scheduled to be paid in FY1999; however, only ¥7,351 million, or 54.3% from the 
schedule, was actually paid. The FY 2000 scheduled payment was increased to 
¥28,756 million. The JMSDF changed the payment schedule again to delay. As a 
result, ¥18,317 million, or 63.7%, was paid in FY2000. 
Two years later in FY2000, the JMSDF procured one DD-type destroyer at 
an estimated 64,071 million yen. Delayed payments for the FY1998 DD affected 
payments for the FY2000 DD in FY2001. The planned ¥2,817 million was carried 
over to the next year and only ¥707 million, or 30%, was paid in FY2001. This 
continuous delay of payments affected the general material expenses in later 
years. 
Consequently, the JMSDF had difficulty managing the shipbuilding 
account and this forced the decision not to acquire any destroyer in FY2005. The 
total defense budget had been stagnant since 1995 so that delayed payments 
brought heavy pressure on the general material expenses category and the 
shipbuilding account itself. 
                                            
89 Ministry of Finance, Budget Database (1953-2006). 
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D. SUMMARY 
Historically, the Japanese economy has been developing since the end of 
WWII as indicated by a GDP that is now fifty times the WWII level. On the other 
hand, the fiscal condition became worse in recent years with approximately 775 
trillion yen of bond issues by the end of FY2006, which is 150.8% of GDP. 
The Japanese government declined to follow an austerity policy in the late 
1990s. Thus, it is not expected that there will be a significant increase in the 
general account budget under the current fiscal policy. As for the defense budget, 
the maximum limit was 1% of the GNP until 1986. Even though the government 
changed the framework of 1% of the GNP to a framework of total expense set 
forth in the Mid-Term Defense Program, 1% of the GNP framework has still been 
considered a criterion for the maximum defense budget expenditure. 
The correlation with the economy caused a negative impact on the 
defense budget when the economy went into a recession. In particular, the oil 
crisis in 1974 and the long recession since 1991 influenced the shipbuilding 
program. The JMSDF cancelled shipbuilding programs for FY1974 because of 
the substantial increase in material costs. In FY2005, the JMSDF did not request 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THE DECLINING DEFENSE 
BUDGETS 
A. IMPACT ON THE JMSDF MARITIME STRATEGY 
1. Shipbuilding Program Overall 
In response to the declining defense budget, the National Defense 
Program Guideline after FY2005 (NDPG) set the target number of destroyers for 
the JMSDF at forty-seven, which was six destroyers less than the current number 
in FY 2006. In fact, FY 2005 was the first time in JMSDF history that a plan to 
build a new destroyer was not included in the budget.  Currently, some Asian 
countries, such as China, India, and Korea, are involved in “a truly impressive 
naval shipbuilding race.” 90  However, considering the date when NDPG was 
approved by the cabinet in December 2004, and the fact that the Japanese fiscal 
year starts on April 1st, the decision not to procure a new destroyer in FY2005 
was probably influenced by a factor other than the international security 
environment. Therefore, the decision to reduce new construction costs could be 

























Figure 4.1 Destroyer Procurement in Fiscal Year91 
 
                                            
90 Massimo Annati, “The Asian DDG Race,” Military Technology 28, no. 11 (Nov, 2004). 
91 Kaijoujiei Shimbunsya, ed., JMSDF Ships and Aircrafts. 
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Since the JMSDF was established, destroyers were not built at a constant 
rate, but not ever lower than 1.0 destroyer per a year until the 1990s. Figure 4.1 
shows the moving average of destroyers procured by five-year periods. As the 
defense budget correlates with the economy, the shipbuilding program has been 
affected by the declining defense budget rather than the national security 
condition. As indicated by the data discussed in the previous chapter (see Figure 
3.1), in order to manage the shipbuilding account the JMSDF continuously 
delayed the scheduled payments. Furthermore, the JMSDF procured two Aegis 
DDGs in FY2002 and FY 2003 and one DDH (13,500 tons) in FY 2004. The total 
cost for these three destroyers reached 378 billion yen, or an average of 126 
billion yen, in comparison to 65 billion yen for the DD (non-Aegis) procurement in 
FY 2001. The total defense budget had been stagnant since 1995 so delayed 
payments brought heavy pressure on the general material expenses category 
and the shipbuilding account itself. Thus, these difficulties logically supported a 
decision not to acquire any destroyer in FY2005. 
Even if modern technology could possibly allow the nation to provide 
security with fewer destroyers, there is no support for the JMSDF to accomplish 
their multiple missions with an insufficient number of platforms. This would be 
considered an impossible challenge. As the NDPG describes the security 
environment surrounding Japan, even though a full-scale invasion is unlikely, 
Japan is threatened with diverse situations in addition to regional security issues 
such as North Korea. Moreover, the NDPG emphasizes the significance of 
sustaining the “security of sea lines of communication which are indispensable to 
the country’s prosperity and growth.”92 
The Japanese fiscal condition, however, does not provide large enough 
budget room to build adequate defense forces. Consequently the Ministry of 
Defense is required to rationalize and streamline personnel, equipment, and  
 
 
                                            
92 “NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINE, FY 2005 and after.” 
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operations so as to attain greater results and provide the best security with the 
limited resources that are available. Further analysis of the JMSDF fleet concept 
is examined in the next section. 
2. The JMSDF Fleet Concept 
The JMSDF has operated the Self Defense Fleet as a mobile force with 
the basic concept described as the “eight by eight fleet concept.” The Self 
Defense Fleet included four Escort Flotillas (EF) and each EF was assigned eight 
destroyers and eight patrol helicopters. Consequently, these flotillas were mainly 
assigned to support an Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) mission.93 
However, the JMSDF reviewed the fleet concept in response to the 
National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG) and approved a new concept in 
2004. The latest fleet concept maintained an outline of four EFs, though the 
division composition was specified as a DDH group to support primarily an ASW 
mission and a DDG group to support primarily a BMD (Ballistic Missile Defense) 
mission. The DDH group consists of four destroyers (one DDH, one DDG, and 
two DDs); the DDG group also consists of four destroyers (one DDG and three 


















Figure 4.2 Example of Mobile Operation Units94                                             
93 “Japan Maritime Self Defense Force,” Global Security, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/jmsdf.htm (accessed April 2007). 
94 Defense Agency, ed., Defense of Japan 2006. 
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The JMSDF currently possess four DDHs as of March 2007. However, the 
first DDH class destroyer, Haruna, was commissioned in 1973 and has spent 
over thirty years at sea. The last DDH, Kurama, was commissioned in 1981. 
Thus, all the DDH class destroyers are considered to be obsolete since they are 
over twenty-five years old. Consequently, the JMSDF plans to decommission 
Haruna in 2008. New DDHs were procured in FY2004 and FY 2006. These ships 
are scheduled to be commissioned in 2008 and 2010.95   
The Japanese government has not previously approved construction of an 
aircraft carrier because such a ship’s offensive characteristics would be against 
the spirit of the Constitution and the exclusively defense-oriented policy. 96 
Although the JMSDF procured and started to build two DDH destroyers that are 
designed to be about 200 meters long with a displacement of 13,500 tons, the 
JMSDF has insisted that they were not aircraft carriers. JMSDF officials have 
stated that Japan did not have nor plan to acquire the specialized vertical-takeoff 
jets that could fly from the new DDH. However, naval experts estimated that the 
new DDHs could carry twelve helicopters and would be slightly larger than 
aircraft carriers in both Spain and Thailand.97 The new DDH design caused a 
political controversy after the image design was changed to a full-length flat deck, 
though the JMSDF has already moved forward to build the new DDH destroyers. 
Figure 4.3 shows an image design of the new DDH with specifications. 
 
                                            
95 “Policy Evaluation Before the Program 2003,” Defense Agency, 
http://www.mod.go.jp/j/info/hyouka/15/jizen/honbun/02.pdf (accessed February 2007). 
96 McCargo, 182. 









Figure 4.3 New DDH image design and specification98 
 
Another hurdle for the DDH program was acquiring a sufficient budget.99 
The JMSDF had already procured two Aegis destroyers, in FY2001 and FY 
2002; those costs amounted to 272 billion yen. In addition, continuously delayed 
payments from the previous shipbuilding program have been increasing the 
pressure on the defense budget. The new DDH shipbuilding cost was estimated 
at 116 billion yen in FY 2003 before approval. Some equipment on board, such 
as the combat management system and the sonar system, were considered for 
elimination to reduce the cost.100  However, the JMSDF resolved the budget 
difficulty by withdrawing the shipbuilding request in FY 2005. Eventually, the 
JMSDF procured the new DDH in FY 2006 with the full equipment package. 
In order to fill an Escort Flotilla, which is composed of a specified DDH 
group and DDG group, it is vital to have Aegis destroyers in the DDG group. The 
JMSDF possessed nine missile guided destroyers (DDG) as of April 2007: five 
Aegis destroyers and four non-Aegis destroyers. However, one non-Aegis 
destroyer was designated as the flagship of the Escort Fleet Force. Thus five 
Aegis destroyers and three non-Aegis destroyers are provided as elements of the 
Escort Flotilla.  
                                            
98 “Policy Evaluation Before the Program 2003.” 
99 “Japan Continues Helicopter-Carrying Cruiser Program,” Sea Power 46, no. 10 (Oct 2003). 
100 Ibid. 
Type DDH 
Displacement 13,500 tonnage 
Length 195 meters 
Speed 30 knot 
Aircraft 4 Helicopters 
Major Equipment 
• CIWS 20 mm 
• VLS Missile Launcher 
• Torpedo Tube 
• Sonar System 
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One of the most significant missions of the JMSDF is to secure the sea 
lines of communication (SLOC) up to a distance of 1,000 miles. Meanwhile, the 
ASDF’s (Air Self Defense Force) capabilities are limited to the home islands of 
Japan so that the JASDF is not able to provide JMSDF fleet air cover support. In 
addition, because of the absence of an aircraft carrier in the fleet, the anti-air 
attack protection is limited.101 Therefore, a critical weakness remains for the 
JMSDF fleet to defend itself against air attack. The DDG destroyers are 
considered vital for both securing the nation from ballistic missile attack and 
sustaining the fleet during air attacks. 
The oldest non-Aegis destroyer, Asakaze, was commissioned in 1979 and 
the latest one, Shimakaze, was commissioned in 1988. After twenty years of 
service, non-Aegis DDG destroyers are considered to be obsolete. Moreover, 
there is a significant difference in capability between non-Aegis and Aegis 
systems in anti-air warfare. Table 4.1 shows a comparison between non-Aegis 
and Aegis systems. 
 
Table 4.1 Comparison between non-Aegis and Aegis capability102  
 Non-Aegis Destroyer Aegis Destroyer 
System Tartar / Standard  Aegis 
Radar Coverage (km) Over a hundred Over several hundred 
Target Tracking Capacity Several targets Over ten targets 
Reaction Time N/A Less than half of non- Aegis 
Maximum Range Over 18 km Over 100 km 
 
In January 15, 2007, DDG Tachikaze was decommissioned after thirty 
years of service, while the new Aegis destroyer Atago was commissioned on 
March 15, 2007. The JMSDF is scheduled to have six Aegis destroyers in 2008, 
including DDG Ashigara which is currently under construction. These Aegis 
destroyers account for 141 billion yen and 128 billion yen in the budget. In 
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addition to the expensive shipbuilding costs for the DDG, the latest regular DD 
destroyer (displacing 5,000 tons) is estimated at 74 billion yen in the FY 2009 
defense budget, which is 9 billion yen higher than the previous destroyer 
procured in FY2001.103 It is a very challenging situation for the JMSDF to sustain 
the total fleet concept with an insufficient defense budget. 
3. The Alliance with the U.S. Navy 
The former Prime Minister, Yasuhiro Nakasone (1982–1987), described 
the turning point in the alliance as the JMSDF deployment to the Middle East to 
support the U.S. led war in Iraq.104 The then Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi, 
made a significant decision to defy all criticism in 2001. The U.S. Navy expected 
the JMSDF to be a “shield to the Seventh Fleet’s sword” during the Cold War era, 
so that they encouraged the JMSDF to concentrate on anti-submarine warfare 
and mine countermeasures.105 In other words, the JMSDF acted in a role that 
complemented the U.S. Navy, fulfilled its overall mission, and met the U.S. 
expectations. Recently, however, “The JMSDF has played a central role in 
supporting the U.S.-led war against terrorism.”106 The alliance with the U.S. Navy 
is in a period of transition. 
The JMSDF provided fuel and logistics support to the U.S. Navy and allied 
naval ships during Operation Enduring Freedom with an Aegis destroyer 
deployment since 2001.107 There was a political controversy in Japan over the 
Aegis DDG deployment to the Indian Ocean that did require resolution. The 
argument was whether an attack by a third party based on the information from 
the JMSDF Aegis destroyer would allow the use of force and thereby violate 
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Article 9.108 However, Prime Minister Koizumi made a decision on the use of 
force by stating that, “[The proposed antiterrorist support law] is within the 
framework of the present Constitution, but just barely. Anything beyond this, and 
we will have no choice but to deal with it by revising the Constitution.” 109 
In addition to joining the Global War on Terrorism, the JMSDF has 
collaborated with the U.S. in the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program. After 
North Korea launched the Taepodong missile in 1998, the Japanese government 
examined the situation and decided to join the U.S. missile defense system. In 
2003, the BMD program was approved by the Security Council and the Koizumi 
cabinet, and scheduled to be in operation starting in 2007. 
The JMSDF regularly operates with the surface-to-air Standard missile; 
the SM-1 and SM-2 were developed for the U.S. Navy as anti-air warfare 
weapons by Raytheon. However, these are not useful for missile defense.110 
Thus, the JMSDF was required to switch the Aegis destroyers to SM-3 launchers 
for the missile defense capability. In FY 2006, the JMSDF allocated 31 billion yen 
for improvements to the existing Aegis system and acquisition of missiles for one 
Aegis destroyer. The total budget related to the BMD program was 157 billion 
yen in FY 2007, 140 billion yen in FY 2006, 120 billion yen in FY 2005, and 107 
billion yen in FY 2004. The JMSDF faced considerable budget restraints in 
modernizing the capability and solidifying the BMD program. Figure 4.4 shows a 
BMD system and the evolution of U.S. approaches. 
Admiral Toru Ishikawa, the JMSDF chief of staff (retired), reminisced that 
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to the Global War on Terrorism, the Japan/U.S. alliance has become more 
important in the common quest to maintain peace and stability in the global 
arena.111 
 
SDI Strategic Defense Initiative 
GPALS Global Protection Against Limited Strikes 
NMD National Missile Defense 
TMD Theater Missile Defense 
MD Missile Defense 
Figure 4.4 BMD system and evolution of U.S. approaches 112 
 
B. SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM 
In this section, the future shipbuilding costs are estimated based on the 
historic shipbuilding cost for each type of destroyer, including the DDG, DDH, DD, 
and DE. Simultaneously, the probability that a particular type of destroyer will be 
built is examined under the defense budget constraints of the Mid-Term Defense 
Program (FY2005 – FY2009). 
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1. Mid-Term Defense Program 
The Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP) is a plan defining the policies of 
building up the defense capability and main projects for five years to achieve the 
new defense forces specified in the National Defense Program Guidelines.113 
Table 4.2 shows the transition of the MDTP since 1986. While the MTDPs (1991-
1995, 1996-2000) were revised to reduce the total amount of defense 
expenditures and number of destroyers, and the MTDP (2001-2005) was 
cancelled, the JMSDF has still successfully accomplished the acquisition of most 
of the planned number of destroyers. 
 














(trillion yen) 18.40¥    22.17¥    24.23¥    25.01¥    24.24¥    
Destroyers
(planned) 9 8 7 5 5
Destroyers
(acquired) 9 8 7 4
Accomplishment
(%) 100 100 100 100  
Note: MTDP (2001 - 2005) was cancelled in December, 2004, and current MTDP 
was introduced from FY 2005. 
 
Initially, at the beginning of the MTDP (2005-2009), the JMSDF did not 
acquire a destroyer in FY 2005. The JMSDF has already acquired one destroyer 
in FY2006 and is budgeted for one destroyer in FY2007. In other words, the 
JMSDF will acquire three destroyers between FY 2008 and FY 2009, if the 
Ministry of Defense is able to adhere to the current effective MTDP. Otherwise, a 
revision to the MTDP will need to be proposed. 
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In the next section, in order to project a probability that a particular type of 
destroyer would be built, the cost estimation was made with simple linear 
regression based on the historical data and then analyzed. 
2. Cost Estimation 
Using the simple linear regression method, shipbuilding costs are shown 
in regression equations with a single variable of displacement.    
a. DDG 
The JMSDF has acquired twelve DDG-type destroyers since 1960. 
The first DDG Amatsukaze (3,050 tons) cost 4.0 billion yen in total, or 15.6 billion 
yen in FY 2000 yen. The latest DDG Ashigara (7,700 tons), commissioned in 
March 2007, amounted to 128.9 billion yen in total, or 138.9 billion yen in FY 
2000 yen. Figure 4.5 shows a regression between displacement and the unit cost 
for the DDG. 






















Multiple R 0.9726 Standard Error ¥10,727 M 
R Square 0.9460 Significance F 0.00 
Figure 4.5 DDG Linear Regression Model 
 
There is a significant difference between non-Aegis and Aegis 
destroyers in terms of shipbuilding cost, because the Aegis system alone is 
60 
estimated to cost approximately 50 billion yen. Assuming that the JMSDF will 
build the next DDG as an Aegis platform, the cost estimation should therefore be 
based on the costs of Aegis destroyers only. 
b. DDH 
The JMSDF acquired four DDH-type destroyers between 1968 and 
1976. It took over twenty-eight years to acquire the fifth DDH destroyer in 2002. 
Figure 4.4 shows a regression for the DDH. However, due to the small number of 
observations (6) and a time break, it may be inappropriate to predict a future 
shipbuilding cost by using this equation. 
Figure 4.6 shows the DDH regression model. As the figure 
indicates, the old type of DDH has approximately a 5,000-ton displacement, as 
opposed to the new type of DDH with a 13,500-ton displacement. There is more 
than twice the difference in displacement. In addition, there was a twenty-five 
year production break before the new shipbuilding started. Therefore, the 
prediction of the future DDH costs should be based on the latest two DDHs’ 
shipbuilding costs, rather than including the four old DDH destroyers.   





















Multiple R 0.9470 Standard Error ¥14,550 M 
R Square 0.8968 Significance F 0.004 
Figure 4.6 DDH Linear Regression Model 
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c. DD 
The JMSDF has acquired forty-eight DD-type destroyers since 
1957. The first DD, Harusame (1,800 tons) cost 1.9 billion yen in total or 9.5 
billion yen in FY 2000 yen. The latest DD (5,000 tons) was budgeted at 75.0 
billion yen in FY 2007, and is scheduled to be commissioned in 2012.  Figure 4.5 
shows the DD linear regression model. As the figure indicates, the relationship 
between displacement and unit cost is well described by the regression equation. 
Also, multiple R, R square, and F stat reveal that the linear regression model 
clearly reflects the relationship between displacement and unit cost. Figure 4.7 
shows the DDH regression model 






















Multiple R 0.9853 Standard Error ¥3,641 M 
R Square 0.9709 Significance F 0.00 
Figure 4.7 DD Linear Regression Model 
 
d. DE 
The JMSDF has procured twenty-four DE-type destroyers since 
1959. The last one, Tone (2,000 tons), was procured at a cost of 25.2 billion yen 
in FY 1989 and was commissioned in 1993. The JMSDF has not built a follow on 
DE-type destroyer. DE destroyers were eventually transferred to the Regional 
Districts, primarily in a Coast Guard role. 
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 Figure 4.8 shows the DE linear regression model. Due to the 
outdated and somewhat clustered data set, this model does not reflect the DE 
regression adequately. However, the previous DD regression model output 
almost covered the displacement range of 1,500 to 2,000 tons. Therefore, the DD 
regression model could be used instead of the DE model for projections.  




















Multiple R 0.8578 Standard Error ¥3,765 M 
R Square 0.7358 Significance F 0.00 
Figure 4.8 DE Linear Regression Model 
 
3. Future Projections for the Shipbuilding Program 
In the MTDP (FY2005-FY2009), the JMSDF is scheduled to acquire five 
destroyers. Two destroyers have been acquired and three more destroyers will 
be acquired within two years. Based on the previous analyses, fleet concept and 
shipbuilding program, it is important to examine the probability of what type of 
destroyers will be procured for the two fiscal years under the current MTDP. 
Two DDG have already been procured under the previous MTDP and are 
ready to replace old non-Aegis DDGs. The oldest DDG in the Escort Flotilla (EF), 
Hatakaze, was procured in 1981 and has been in service for twenty-one years. In 
comparison, the previous DDG was decommissioned after thirty-one years of 
service. The JMSDF has not forecasted the procurement of a DDG destroyer 
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under the current MTDP, but one may be required during the next MTDP to 
sustain the eight DDG destroyers in the EF.  
Two DDHs were procured in FY 2004 and FY 2006 to replace old DDHs 
that were procured in FY1968 and FY 1970. Thus, the oldest DDH would be 
Shirane, procured in FY 1975. The JMSDF does not forecast the procurement of 
a DDH destroyer under the current MTDP for the same reason as that for the 
DDG destroyer. The JMSDF, however, may be required to acquire two DDH 
destroyers under the next MTDP. 
Currently, the JMSDF is forecasting the procurement of three DD or DE 
destroyers under the current MTDP. Considering the shipbuilding expenditures 
ratio in the total amount of the MTDP, the average is calculated at 0.28% per 
ship (see Table 4.3). Thus, shipbuilding expenditures in the MTDP are estimated 
to be 339.4 billion yen for five destroyers. 172 billion yen has already been spent, 
so that the JMSDF is projected to expend the remaining 167 billion yen for the 
shipbuilding program in FY 2008 and FY 2009.  
 












(billion yen)  ¥  18,400  ¥  22,170  ¥  24,230   ¥  24,240 
Shipbuilding expenditures 
(billion yen) 
 ¥  408.6 
9 ships  
 ¥  609.3 
8 ships 
 ¥  451.9 
7 ships  
¥  339.4 
5 ships  
Ratio per ship 
(%) 0.25 0.31 0.27 
 
 0.28 
Note: MTDP (FY2001-FY2005) was cancelled so that it was not included 
in determining the average. 
 
Using the DD linear regression equation, the JMSDF can forecast which 
class of DD could be procured and how much the tonnage would be. For 
example, assuming the JMSDF will procure three of the same class of DD 
destroyers, the average cost should be 59 billion yen in FY 2000 yen and this is 
converted to a tonnage of 4,260.  
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C. TECHNOLOGY AND THS SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY 
1. Three Principles on Arms Export 
Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, Nobel Prize for Peace winner in 1974, stated 
the Three Principles on Arms Export in 1967. The principles provide that the 
arms exports to the following countries shall not be permitted: 
• Communist Bloc Countries; 
• Countries to which arms exports are prohibited under the United 
Nations resolutions; or 
• Countries those are actually involved or likely to become involved in 
international conflicts.116 
Subsequently, in February 1976, the Japanese Government announced 
the collateral guideline to strengthen the policy. It said that, “The ‘arms’ exports to 
other areas not included in the Three Principles will also be restrained in 
conformity with Japan's position as a peace-loving nation.”117 In other words, the 
government shall abstain from promoting arms exports, regardless of the 
destinations.118 In 1983, the government changed its policy to open the way for 
the transfer of military technology to the United States as the only exception to 
their principles. However, the U.S. already held large defense industries, so this 
change was not seen as a relaxation of standards for Japanese defense 
industries. 
While, the Japanese government imposed a strict restriction on arms 
exports, it remains a major arms importer; Japan was the largest importer among 
the industrially advanced nations and was fifth in total amounts of arms imports 
from 1976 to 2005.119 According to the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI) database, most of the arms are imported from the U.S. and  
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Table 4.4 shows the trend of arms transfers (FY1990$M) from 1998 to 2005. The 
amount significantly decreased in 2000 and with the exception of 2003 continues 
to decrease. 
   
Table 4.4 Arms Transfer to Japan (FY1990$M) 120  
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Arms Transfer 1,249 1,080 302 333 307 351 298 250 
 
As Iwata Norio, Deputy Director of the Research and Development 
Planning Division, Bureau of Equipment, Japan Defense Agency, pointed out, “a 
country's defense capability, in equipment terms, is based primarily on its 
manufacturing capability. The Defense Agency believes that a healthy and 
efficient defense industry is an essential condition for the appropriate build-up of 
defense capability.”121  
The Three Principles on Arms Export, however, prevent the defense 
industry from seeking a foreign market outside of Japan. If the government 
adheres to the principles on arms exports, care should be taken to maintain a 
vigorous domestic defense market as an inducement for the defense industry to 
remain capable of producing the equipment the country needs. Otherwise, 
Japanese defense companies would exit the market and the SDF would suffer 
enormously and have some difficulties in acquiring equipment. 
2. Impacts on the Shipbuilding Industry 
The total amount for defense procurement has been on a downward trend. 
That puts increasing financial stress on the defense industry.122 However, it must 
be remembered that the total amount of defense production was only 0.64% of 
the total amount of industrial production in FY2004. (See Appendix C) Moreover, 
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shipbuilding expenses by the Ministry of Defense were less than 0.1%. Therefore, 
the declining defense budget has not impacted detrimentally the overall industry. 
In Japan, there are six major shipbuilding companies: 
• Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. 
• IHI Marine United Inc. 
• Kawasaki Shipbuilding Corporation 
• Mitsui Engineering & Shipbuilding Co., Ltd. 
• Universal Shipbuilding Corporation 
• Sasebo Heavy Industries Co., Ltd.   
       (See details in Appendix D) 
By comparing the latest destroyer shipbuilding costs (¥80 billion) to the 
total sales revenue of shipbuilding companies, one can determine that the 
defense shipbuilding accounts for 6% of the total revenue. The ratio of 
shipbuilding expense by the Ministry of Defense to total sales of each 
shipbuilding company is very small. Consequently, the declining defense budget 
has not severely impacted the shipbuilding industry itself. 
However, due to increasing steel material costs and foreign shipbuilding 
companies, the Japanese shipbuilding industry is suffering reduced profits and 
moving to restructure. For example, a major shipbuilding company, Hitachi Zosen, 
offered to sell its shipbuilding department to JFE Shoji Holdings, Inc. in 2006.123 
If the offer is approved, it will be the first case where a major shipbuilding 
company exits from the industry. In spite of the worldwide shipbuilding boom, the 
Japanese shipbuilding companies have not necessarily received the benefits. 
Meanwhile, in entering the shipbuilding market, a company will incur a 
large initial investment in areas such as facilities, drydocks, materials, and 
human resources. There are many barriers for entry into the shipbuilding market.  
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This implies that if a company exits the shipbuilding industry, new companies will 
rarely enter the market to compensate, so that the overall domestic market will 
decrease.  
This shrinking shipbuilding industry negatively affects the JMSDF’s ability 
to acquire destroyers. Assuming that the shipbuilding demand all over the world 
will be increasing or steady in the near future, the industry shrinkage in Japan will 
cause an increase in unit cost for the JMSDF destroyers, because shipbuilding 
companies will gain bargaining power with less competitiveness. In addition, in 
spite of several shipbuilding companies existing in the market, competition over 
defense contracts is less likely to occur over orders from the JMSDF. Recently, 
some shipbuilding companies did not join in bidding for such contracts because 
of their production capacities.124 
Furthermore, another problem is a lack of a timely response in case of 
emergency. A large initial investment makes it impossible to establish a 
shipbuilding company in a short time period, so that a large expenditure of funds 
would be required to recover the shipbuilding skills and facilities. “It is therefore 
increasingly important to secure and maintain a sound and efficient defense 
production and technological base.”125  The impact on shipbuilding techniques 
and continued maintenance of high quality is examined in the next section.  
3. Technical Impact on Shipbuilding 
The declining defense budget negatively impacts the sustenance of the 
high skill and quality in shipbuilding. Put another way, the declining defense 
budget mandates reductions in shipbuilding costs, with corresponding 
deterioration in quality as shipbuilders seek to cut those costs. In order to 
maintain a certain level of skill in shipbuilding, companies need to build 
destroyers continuously at a cost that will earn them a profit. However, because 
orders from the JMSDF have decreased, shipbuilding companies are having 
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trouble keeping workers proficient. In fact, some destroyers have had significant 
problems just after commissioning or during the periodic maintenance 
availabilities. 
For example, the destroyer Oonami was commissioned in March, 2003 
and conducted annual maintenance between December 2003 and January 2004.  
During that maintenance, a crack was found on the mast and as a result of the 
investigation, it was recognized that a welding error during construction caused 
the crack. After the problem was ascertained, the JMSDF was ordered to inspect 
the eleven destroyers which mounted the same type of mast. 
 
                                            Source: Asagumo News 
Figure 4.9 Kirisame’s Broken Mast 
 
Even after the inspection, the destroyer Kirisame’s mast broke during a 
sortie to avoid a typhoon in September, 2005 (See Figure 4.9).126 Kirisame is a 
sister ship to Oonami and passed the inspection at the time of Oonami’s mast 
problem. However, since Kirisame recorded a strong gust of wind (50m/second) 
during the evacuation, the snapping of its mast cannot as easily be connected to 
a welding error. However, it should concern the JMSDF that there could be a 
connection with shipbuilding quality. It should also be noted that Oonami and 
Kirisame were built by the largest shipbuilding company in Japan. 
Sustaining highly skilled workers is even more important for submarines, 
where the smallest technical error might result in tragedy with a detrimental 
political impact. There are two shipbuilding companies for submarines in Japan 
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and the JMSDF has procured one submarine every year continually from 1956. 
In each year of the previous Mid-Term Defense Programs (1986-2005), the 
number of new submarines to be built was five, and actually, five submarines 
were built in five years. However, in the latest MTDP, the number was reduced to 
four submarines. 
D. SUMMARY 
Several impacts of the declining defense budget indicate that the JMSDF 
has to confront a challengeable situation to sustain capability and to review 
maritime strategy. The JMSDF acquired six Aegis destroyers and two 13,500-ton 
DDHs in recent years; simultaneously, the shipbuilding account seemed to be 
difficult to manage and this forced the decision not to acquire any destroyer in 
FY2005. Under such a situation, cost estimation is significant for future 
projections. For example, using a simple linear regression method, it can be 
projected what kind of destroyers and their tonnages are likely to be procured. 
Meanwhile, ship sales to the JMSDF account for very a small part of the 
shipbuilding industry and the government’s severe restriction on arms exports 
made the defense market less attractive. This may cause the shipbuilding 
companies to exit the defense industry. As a result, the JMSDF would have some 
difficulty in sustaining the quality of shipbuilding for combatant ships. 
The next chapter summarizes the studies conducted in the previous 
chapters to describe an appropriate level of the future defense budget. It also 
contains the recommendations and areas of further research that should be 





































V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
A. CONCLUSIONS  
National defense is an example of a public good, because it is neither 
excludable nor rivaled.127 Excludable means that people can be prevented from 
using the service; rivaled means that one person’s use reduces another person’s 
ability to use the service. The character of national defense as a public good 
makes it difficult to find the standard level of national defense expenditure. Thus, 
the argument is always whether the defense budget is too small or too large. Due 
to the uncertainty of preventing war and difficulty of protecting one’s own property 
alone, the requirement for a defense budget may be overestimated and the 
budget may be overspent under an uncertain international security 
environment.128 Furthermore, the cost of failure in national security is extremely 
high and the whole nation would suffer significant losses.  
The argument about national defense expenditures is a classic economic 
example of the tradeoff between guns and butter. “The more we spend on 
national defense (guns) to protect our shores from foreign aggressors, the less 
we can spend on consumer goods (butter) to raise our standard of living at 
home.”129 In other words, every country should determine the size of its military 
and the defense budget to maintain national security, in competition with 
domestic demands for public resources. 
Japan regained sovereignty in 1951 by the San Francisco Peace Treaty 
with the Allied Powers.  However, at that time, it was not expected to sustain full- 
scale military forces, so the Japanese government could place emphasis on 
accelerating economic development. In other words, the government budgeted 
for “butter” in order to enrich daily life.  As the economy recovered and grew 
rapidly, it was no longer considered acceptable to concentrate only on the home 
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country alone. Japan should contribute immensely to the international peace and 
stability as a developed country. The argument is over how much defense budget 
should be spent for “guns’” as appropriate.      
The international security environment has drastically changed since the 
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Countries are required to cooperate in 
their fight against global terrorism. As the country with the world’s second largest 
GNP, Japan should contribute to global security.130 The JMSDF should complete 
its dual missions of national security and contribution to worldwide stability in 
strong and close connection with the U.S. Navy. The JMSDF is in a period of 
transition in terms of maritime strategy, fleet concept, and the U.S. alliance.  
The declining defense budget has had a significant influence on the 
JMSDF, especially on the shipbuilding program. The defense budgetary cutback, 
however, was caused by the retrenchment in fiscal policy, rather than the 
alteration of defense policy. The long recession in the 1990s decreased tax 
revenue and increased the government bond debt. The Japanese fiscal condition 
will continue to be on the brink of a crisis with such a large amount of bond 
obligations outstanding. Considering such a fiscal condition, the defense budget 
was no longer exempt from the restructuring in Japanese fiscal policy. It could be 
said that the result of the declining defense budget was the lack of destroyer 
procurement in FY 2005. 
Furthermore, the structure of the shipbuilding account in the defense 
budget is considered one of the problems. The shipbuilding account is a typical 
example of a continuing expense, which makes it possible to delay payments 
within five years. While the flexibility of payments provides a big advantage for 
managing the shipbuilding account, it easily leads to delayed payments and 
promotes a tendency to depend heavily on payments being carried over.  
Finally, Adam Smith, the father of economics, described the expense of 
defense in his book “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
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Nations.” He said that, “The first duty of the sovereign, that of protecting the 
society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies, can be 
performed only by means of a military force.”131  He also added, however, “The 
first duty of the sovereign…grows gradually more and more expensive, as the 
society advances in civilization. “132  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Toward a Sustainable Fiscal Structure 
The structure of the defense budget should be changed to a sustainable 
fiscal structure. The current structure of the shipbuilding account relies too much 
on future-year expenditures. In other words, accounts payable have been 
increasing significantly as a result of the declining defense budget. This results in 
a diminished elasticity in the defense budget and affects not only defense policy 
decisions such as the fleet concept, but also daily operation and maintenance. 
Therefore, the defense budgets should be built based on a solid estimation of 
internal and external situations.  
2. Prioritization of Budget Allocation 
An allotment of funds according to established priorities would be very 
important under the circumstances in which the defense budget has been 
stagnant and uncertainty is increasing. Even though the defense budget has 
been reduced, year-end (sweep-up) funds never disappear because of the 
reservation of funds for an emergency. End-of-year spending can be inefficient 
and wasteful because of the notion of use it, or lose it. Even though there are 
some legal regulations about duration, purpose, and amount expended, some 
amount of the budget might be used to offset money already spent. 
Therefore, prioritization through revision of all expenditure items is 
significant among the whole budget cycle, which starts from planning to actual 
payment. Unless a solid future defense plan exists, prioritizing the policy and                                             
131 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Harvard 
Classics; v.10.: Collier, 1956), 653. 
132 Ibid, 668. 
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allocating the budget adequately is impossible. Thus, the JMSDF should prepare 
to provide a feasible and an effective future plan with precise cost estimation.    
3. Promotion of the Domestic Defense Industry 
The Japanese government has imposed strict restrictions on arms exports 
due to the Three Principles on Arms Export. The JMSDF is required to get 
permission from the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) even to 
send repair parts to fleet elements deployed to a foreign country. Such a strict 
control on arms sales makes the defense market less attractive to potential 
suppliers. Therefore, in order to promote the defense industry in Japan, the 
Three Principles on Arms Export should be considered for review. 
If the principles were to be somewhat relaxed, it would be beneficial to 
both the Ministry of Defense and the defense industry. For example, increasing 
production volume reduces unit cost and increases productivity; international 
competition contributes to increased capability and quality.133 At the same time, 
the government should establish a way to track arms exports from the point of 
view of the Global War on Terrorism. It cannot be complicit in passing arms to 
terrorists. 
4. Sustain the Alliance with the U.S. 
Consistently, Japanese defense policy has been based on the alliance 
with the U.S. since the establishment of the Self Defense Force. Even though the 
Cold War is over, the security environment has been confronted with new threats 
such as the terrorist attacks in the U.S. on September 11, 2001. These attacks 
indicated a difficulty in securing the nation by an individual country. Therefore, 
Japan should sustain close cooperation with the U.S. to secure the nation and its 
vicinity. 
The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the U.S. forces stationed in Japan 
have deterred instability in the area and any direct invasion of Japan. It would 
cost a prohibitive amount of money for Japan to secure itself on its own. 
                                            
133 Ikawa. 
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Moreover, Japan’s own defense capability is not by itself enough for national 
security and the fiscal conditions do not permit such a defense burden. Japan 
should continue to maintain credibility with the U.S and the JMSDF should work 
with the U.S. Navy to enhance interoperability through mutual understanding. 
C. AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
The current Mid-Term Defense Program covers the period between 
FY2005 and FY2009. The Ministry of Defense will prepare for the next MTDP 
(covering FY2010 through FY2014), which will be approved by the Cabinet 
around December 2009. The method of estimating the feasibility  
of acquiring destroyers under the current MTDP was introduced and examined in 
this thesis. In order to create the next MTDP, more precise cost estimation 
should be conducted. 
The U.S. Navy operates the Naval Center for Cost Analysis (NCCA), 
whose missions are: 
• to guide, direct and strengthen cost analysis within the Department of 
the Navy; 
• to ensure the preparation of credible cost estimates of the resources 
required to develop, procure and operate military systems and forces in 
support of planning, programming, budgeting and acquisition 
management; 
• to perform such other functions and tasks as may be directed by higher 
authority.134 
 “NCCA uses cost analysis techniques to estimate the acquisition, 
operation and support costs (e.g., life-cycle costs) of new Navy systems in order 
to assist top-level management in determining the optimal use of resources and 
assist program managers in making cost-effective decisions through the life-cycle 
of systems.”135 Appendix E shows an organization chart for NCAA.  
                                            
134 “NCAA Mission,” Naval Center for Cost Analysis, 
http://www.ncca.navy.mil/about/mission.cfm (accessed April 2007). 
135 “NCAA Cost Analysis 101,” Naval Center for Cost Analysis, 
http://www.ncca.navy.mil/about/101.cfm (accessed April 2007). 
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In comparison to the U.S. Navy, which has projected cost estimation quite 
systematically with historical data collection, the JMSDF cost estimation methods 
are far behind. Therefore, the JMSDF should consider examining and introducing 
the cost analysis method from the U.S. Navy.    
Finally, the last consideration is to measure the optimal size of the 
defense budget. The average age of the population is progressing and is 
expected to continue growing in Japan. Social security expenditures increase 
with aging, so that the proportion of social security to general expenditures 
exceeded forty percent of total expenditures in the FY 2006 budget.136 
In order to use scarce budget resources effectively, the balance between 
guns and butter should be carefully considered when allocating expenditures. 
Formerly, the Japanese regarded “butter” expenditure as important for postwar 
rehabilitation and this choice seemed appropriate. As a result, the defense 
budget was restricted under the GNP to a 1-percent limit. Both the domestic and 
international environments, however, have changed considerably during the sixty 
years since WW II. Even though it is a very challenging task, the government 
should examine the allocation between these two conflicting needs. It is time to 
re-evaluate the balance between guns and butter.   
                                            
136 Teruhiko Mano, “The Balance Between Guns and Butter” Mitsubishi UFJ Research & 
Consulting, Aug 9, 2006, http://www.murc.jp/info/detail.php?i=275 (accessed April 2007). 
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APPENDIX A: THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE 
(EXTRACT) 
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1955 ¥8,597.90 ¥47,939.30 - - 
1956 ¥9,647.70 ¥51,194.80 5.10% 0.1860 
1957 ¥11,064.10 ¥55,364.70 6.00% 0.1971 
1958 ¥11,845.10 ¥59,010.10 0.40% 0.1979 
1959 ¥13,897.00 ¥65,628.20 5.50% 0.2088 
1960 ¥16,680.60 ¥73,504.10 7.20% 0.2238 
1961 ¥20,170.80 ¥82,124.90 8.20% 0.2422 
1962 ¥22,328.80 ¥88,318.30 2.90% 0.2492 
1963 ¥26,228.60 ¥97,502.50 6.40% 0.2652 
1964 ¥30,399.70 ¥106,753.70 5.90% 0.2808 
1965 ¥33,765.30 ¥113,361.90 4.60% 0.2937 
1966 ¥39,698.90 ¥125,882.20 5.90% 0.3111 
1967 ¥46,445.40 ¥139,779.90 5.40% 0.3279 
1968 ¥54,947.00 ¥157,058.90 5.30% 0.3452 
1969 ¥65,061.40 ¥175,940.10 5.70% 0.3649 
1970 ¥75,298.50 ¥190,448.00 6.90% 0.3901 
1971 ¥82,899.30 ¥200,051.90 4.80% 0.4088 
1972 ¥96,486.30 ¥218,214.50 6.70% 0.4362 
1973 ¥116,715.00 ¥229,326.20 15.10% 0.5021 
1974 ¥138,451.10 ¥228,242.50 19.20% 0.5985 
1975 ¥152,361.60 ¥237,329.50 5.80% 0.6332 
1976 ¥171,293.40 ¥246,262.10 8.30% 0.6857 
1977 ¥190,094.50 ¥257,411.80 6.20% 0.7283 
1978 ¥208,602.20 ¥271,349.30 4.10% 0.7581 
1979 ¥225,237.20 ¥285,320.50 2.70% 0.7786 
1980 ¥245,546.60 ¥292,737.40 6.30% 0.8276 
1981 ¥260,801.30 ¥301,489.50 3.10% 0.8533 
1982 ¥273,322.40 ¥310,825.60 1.70% 0.8678 
1983 ¥285,593.40 ¥318,689.60 1.90% 0.8843 
1984 ¥305,144.10 ¥331,753.70 2.60% 0.9073 
1985 ¥324,289.60 ¥345,446.00 2.10% 0.9263 
1986 ¥339,363.30 ¥356,286.30 1.50% 0.9402 

















1988 ¥379,656.80 ¥395,531.60 0.80% 0.9478 
1989 ¥406,476.80 ¥413,120.40 2.50% 0.9715 
1990 ¥438,815.80 ¥436,043.80 2.30% 0.9938 
1991 ¥463,174.40 ¥448,902.70 2.50% 1.0186 
1992 ¥471,882.00 ¥450,605.90 1.50% 1.0339 
1993 ¥476,746.10 ¥452,757.60 0.60% 1.0401 
1994 ¥487,017.50 ¥470,888.00 -0.20% 1.0380 
1995 ¥496,457.30 ¥482,749.50 -0.60% 1.0318 
1996 ¥508,432.80 ¥496,903.80 -0.50% 1.0267 
1997 ¥513,306.40 ¥496,877.20 1.00% 1.0369 
1998 ¥503,304.40 ¥489,438.10 -0.50% 1.0317 
1999 ¥499,544.20 ¥493,048.70 -1.50% 1.0163 
2000 ¥504,118.80 ¥505,621.90 -1.60% 1.0000 
2001 ¥493,644.70 ¥501,617.50 -1.30% 0.9870 
2002 ¥489,875.20 ¥507,014.90 -1.80% 0.9692 
2003 ¥493,747.50 ¥517,714.70 -1.30% 0.9566 
2004 ¥498,275.00 ¥527,825.80 -1.00% 0.9471 
2005 ¥503,293.20 ¥540,400.60 -1.30% 0.9348 
2006 N/A N/A -1.00% 0.9254 
2007 N/A N/A -1.00% 0.9162 
2008 N/A N/A -1.00% 0.9070 
2009 N/A N/A -1.00% 0.8979 
2010 N/A N/A -1.00% 0.8889 
 
 
Note:  GDP FY1955-1993: 68SNA basis, FY1994-2005: 93SNA basis 
 Base Year FY 2000 (Billion Yen) 
 Inflation rate is based on GDP deflators (Changes from the previous year) 
 According to the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy, the Japanese 
economy is still in the deflation.  
 
 
Source: Department of National Accounts, Cabinet Office, GDP Long-Term Time 
Series 
 Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy, “Basic Policies for Economic 
and Fiscal Management and Structural Reform 2004” (January, 2007)  
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APPENDIX C: CHANGES IN AMOUNT OF JAPAN’S DEFENSE PRODUCTION 
Fiscal 
Year 
Total Amount of Defense 
Production 




1993 ¥1,783,063 ¥310,130,630 0.57 
1994 ¥1,828,774 ¥298,039,512 0.61 
1995 ¥1,857,911 ¥306,625,837 0.61 
1996 ¥1,960,507 ¥313,617,190 0.63 
1997 ¥1,858,929 ¥323,914,665 0.57 
1998 ¥1,740,774 ¥305,510,465 0.57 
1999 ¥1,803,697 ¥289,879,438 0.62 
2000 ¥1,842,805 ¥318,104,966 0.58 
2001 ¥1,860,817 ¥286,045,175 0.65 
2002 ¥1,840,037 ¥268,205,996 0.69 
2003 ¥1,792,869 ¥273,404,240 0.66 
2004 ¥1,830,494 ¥284,7463,61 0.64 
Notes: * Entries for Industrial Production are based on figures in the Census of 
Manufactures compiled by the Research and Statistics Department, Ministry of 
Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI). 
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APPENDIX D: MAJOR SHIPBUILDING COMPANIES IN JAPAN  
 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. 
 Capital    265.6 billion yen 
 Employees    32,627 
 Total Sales (consolidated)  2,792.1 billion yen 
 Defense Sales   241.7 billion yen 
 Website    http://www.mhi.co.jp 
 
IHI Marine United Inc. 
 Capital    10.1 billion yen 
 Employees    2,000 
 Net Sales    100 billion yen 
 Defense Sales (consolidated) 34.8 billion yen 
 Website    http://ihins.ihi.co.jp/ihimu/ 
 
Universal Shipbuilding Corporation 
 Capital    25 billion yen 
 Employees    3,200 
 Sales Total    139.7 billion yen 
 Defense Sales   39.7 billion yen 
 Website    http://www.u-zosen.co.jp 
 
Kawasaki Shipbuilding Corporation 
 Employees    1,922 
 Total Sales    109.6 billion yen 
 Defense Sales   35.3 billion yen 
 Website   http://www.kawasakizosen.co.jp/index.html 
 
Mitsui Engineering & Shipbuilding Co., Ltd. 
 Capital    44.385 billion yen 
 Employees    3,832 
 Sales Total    293.987 billion yen 
 Website    http://www.mes.co.jp 
 
Sasebo Heavy Industries Co., Ltd.   
 Capital    8.4 billion yen 
 Employees    1,114 
 Sales Total     50.4 billion yen 
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